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Technology Assessment 2.0 
REVAMPING OUR APPROACH TO EMERGING 
TECHNOLOGIES* 
Albert C. Lin† 
INTRODUCTION 
We live in an era of rapid and potentially revolutionary 
technological changes. These changes will play a critical role in 
addressing many of the problems facing human society. 
Improvements in energy efficiency may reduce our dependence 
on fossil fuels. Redesigned manufacturing processes may 
require less energy and generate less waste. Geoengineering 
projects may mitigate some of the effects of climate change. 
And developments in synthetic biology and nanotechnology 
may increase food production, generate new pharmaceuticals, 
remediate environmental pollution, and transform countless 
aspects of our lives.  
At the same time, however, new technologies also raise the 
specter of adverse health effects, environmental degradation and 
disaster, and even dehumanization, should those technologies go 
awry. As past experiences teach us, new technologies do not 
merely solve old problems. Often, technologies create problems of 
their own, many of which reveal themselves only with time. 
Addressing these problems becomes especially difficult when 
technological systems become entrenched.1 New technologies pose 
  
 * © 2011 Albert C. Lin. All rights reserved. 
 † Professor of Law, University of California, Davis, School of Law. Thanks to 
Eric Biber, Peter Lee, and workshop participants at the Arizona State University 
School of Law Southwest/West Junior Scholars Conference for thoughtful feedback. 
Thanks also to Dean Kevin Johnson, Associate Dean Vik Amar, and the U.C. Davis 
School of Law for financial support for this project, and to Anna Berces, Aylin Bilir, 
Autumn Luna, and Nick Warden for their research assistance. 
 1 See DAVID COLLINGRIDGE, THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF TECHNOLOGY 17-19 (1980) 
(“[B]y the time a technology is sufficiently well developed and diffused for its unwanted 
social consequences to become apparent, it is no longer easily controlled.”); RICHARD 
SCLOVE, WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS, REINVENTING TECHNOLOGY 
ASSESSMENT: A 21ST CENTURY MODEL 2-3 (2010), available at http://wilsoncenter.org/ 
topics/docs/ReinventingTechnologyAssessment1.pdf. 
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a particularly high potential for unexpected effects.2 They also 
have the potential to change cultural norms and social 
relationships in unpredictable ways.3 German sociologist Ulrich 
Beck succinctly characterized the connection between science and 
risk in his book Risk Society, where he noted, “Science is one of the 
causes [of risks], the medium of definition [of risks] and the source 
of solutions to risks.”4 
Given the transformative yet destabilizing potential of 
new technologies, it is critical to maximize our understanding of 
them and their effects—intended and unintended—as they are 
developed, introduced, and disseminated. While it would be 
naïve to think that we can fully predict the course of a 
technology’s development and its consequences, ongoing and 
methodical evaluation can help us to anticipate, avoid, manage, 
and mitigate adverse effects. Merely carrying out more effective 
technology assessment is not sufficient, however. Because of the 
wide-ranging effects of technologies on society and individual 
lives, the assessment of emerging technologies must be 
broadened beyond technical experts to involve the general 
public. This article identifies tools for carrying out more open, 
effective, and encompassing technology management. 
Part I begins with a brief introduction to several 
technologies that will be among the most important and 
controversial in the coming decades: biotechnology (including 
synthetic biology), nanotechnology, and geoengineering. The 
pervasive potential of these technologies warrants their 
thorough consideration as well as increased public 
participation in decision-making processes about them. As Part 
II explains, tools such as technology assessment and 
environmental impact assessment were developed in an 
attempt to understand and predict the ramifications of new 
technologies and to increase public involvement. For various 
reasons, however, these efforts generally have not achieved 
effective assessment or meaningful public participation, 
leaving the forces of technological change seemingly 
uncontrolled. Part III explores how we might better manage 
technology and its consequences. One option simply involves 
  
 2 Noting the increasingly unpredictable consequences of new technologies, 
David Owen has examined the possible implications for the requirement of 
foreseeability in tort law. David G. Owen, Bending Nature, Bending Law, 62 FLA. L. 
REV. 569 (2010). 
 3 See COLLINGRIDGE, supra note 1, at 11, 16. 
 4 ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY 155 (Mark 
Ritter trans., Sage Publ’ns 1992). 
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broader and more effective implementation of existing 
management tools that we have never fully utilized, such as 
technology assessment. Some efforts along these lines have 
been initiated, but their ultimate impact remains uncertain. 
More radical options, such as conducting national technology 
referenda or requiring assurance bonds for technologies with 
uncertain effects, are needed to bring about participatory and 
effective management of emerging technologies. 
I. THE CHALLENGE OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 
Broadly defined, technology includes the tools, 
techniques, and knowledge that humans use to mediate their 
environment. Technology and the environment are inherently 
related, and emerging technologies, which are often incompletely 
understood, pose a challenging conundrum to societies that seek 
to reap their benefits while avoiding serious adverse harms. 
A. The Technologies of Tomorrow 
This section briefly discusses some of the technologies 
that are expected to have broad and revolutionary impacts on 
human societies and the environment in the near future. The 
goal here is not to provide a comprehensive account of these 
fields, but rather to demonstrate that such technologies 
warrant careful consideration and public deliberation. 
1. Biotechnology 
The term biotechnology, as used in this article, refers 
both to conventional genetic engineering, in which existing 
genetic material from one organism is transferred to another, 
and to synthetic biology, in which researchers synthesize novel 
genetic material coding for desired traits. Genetic engineering 
is a well-established technology projected to expand into 
numerous new applications in the coming years, whereas 
synthetic biology is in a comparatively early stage of research 
and development.5 The discussion below focuses on agricultural 
biotechnology, which has proven particularly controversial.6 
  
 5 See Jim Haseloff & Jim Ajioka, Synthetic Biology: History, Challenges, and 
Prospects, 6 J. ROYAL SOC’Y INTERFACE S389 (2009), available at http://rsif. 
royalsocietypublishing.org/content/early/2009/06/02/rsif.2009.0176.focus.full.pdf+html. 
 6 Other applications of genetic engineering include the manufacture of 
synthetic insulin, human growth hormone, and other desired proteins for medical 
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a. Genetic Engineering 
Genetic engineering, the manipulation of existing 
genetic material to produce desired traits in an organism, has 
gained widespread use in crop modification over the past two 
decades.7 Genetic engineering offers two major advantages over 
traditional breeding techniques. Through the introduction of 
transgenes—genetic material isolated from one organism and 
transferred to another—genetic engineers can incorporate a 
wider range of desired traits into a crop, including traits 
originally found only in unrelated species.8 In addition, desired 
traits can be incorporated into a crop far more quickly through 
genetic engineering than through traditional crossbreeding.9 To 
date, genetic engineers have focused primarily on incorporating 
pesticidal traits or herbicide resistance into commodity crops.10 
Genetically modified varieties have become widely prevalent 
among major crops, accounting for 80% of corn, 92% of 
soybeans, 86% of cotton, and 93% of canola planted in the 
United States.11 Furthermore, an estimated 75% of processed 
foods in U.S. grocery stores contain genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs) of some sort.12 Now, genetic engineers are 
turning their attention not only to improving crop traits such 
as drought resistance and enhanced yields, but also to 
developing plants and animals that will produce 
pharmaceutical compounds and industrial chemicals.13 
Notwithstanding the widespread presence of GMOs in 
agriculture and in the food supply, critics have continued to 
raise concerns about potential health and environmental 
hazards associated with these crops. Health concerns generally 
involve potential allergenicity and toxicity.14 Genes code for 
  
treatment. See Alan McHughen, Learning from Mistakes: Missteps in Public 
Acceptance Issues with GMOs, in WHAT CAN NANOTECHNOLOGY LEARN FROM 
BIOTECHNOLOGY? 33, 39-40 (Kenneth David & Paul B. Thompson eds., 2008). 
 7 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-60, GENETICALLY 
ENGINEERED CROPS 1-2 (2008) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. 
 8 See id. 
 9 See id. 
 10 See Gregory Jaffe, The Next Generation, ENVTL. F., Mar./Apr. 2009, at 38. 
 11 GAO REPORT, supra note 7, at 1. 
 12 Americans Clueless About Gene-Altered Foods, MSNBC.COM (Mar. 23, 
2005, 6:13 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7277844. 
 13 See GAO REPORT, supra note 7, at 1; Gregory N. Mandel, Gaps, 
Inexperience, Inconsistencies, and Overlaps: Crisis in the Regulation of Genetically 
Modified Plants and Animals, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2167, 2186-89 (2004). 
 14 Mandel, supra note 13, at 2190-94. 
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proteins, which are potential food allergens, and thus the 
transfer of genes from one plant to another may transfer 
allergenic properties along with it.15 Toxic effects might arise 
from pesticides produced by engineered crops,16 or from 
inadvertent increases in naturally occurring toxins resulting 
from genetic manipulation.17 Genetic modification of plants can 
even lead to the creation of biological components that have not 
previously existed in nature, possibly causing unexpected 
allergenic or toxic effects.18 Environmental risks include the 
potential for gene transfer and ecosystem disruption.19 Gene 
transfer refers to the movement of transgenes through cross-
pollination or other means from an engineered crop to relatives 
of that crop, including other varieties of that crop or a crop’s 
wild relatives.20 The transfer of transgenes could disrupt 
ecosystems in various ways. On the one hand, wild relatives 
might demonstrate increased weediness and crowd out 
competing species; on the other hand, a rare wild species may 
become extinct as it interbreeds and hybridizes with 
engineered crops.21 Other environmental hazards include the 
establishment of wild populations of transgenic plants, and 
mortality among nontarget, beneficial species that consume 
crops engineered to contain pesticides.22 The development of 
genetically modified plants that can produce drugs and 
industrial chemicals may pose even more significant health 
and environmental risks, as inedible and potentially harmful 
  
 15 Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. 4706, 
4728 (Jan. 18, 2001) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 192, 592); see also Dean D. 
Metcalfe, What Are the Issues in Addressing the Allergenic Potential of Genetically 
Modified Foods?, 111 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1110, 1111 (2003) (noting that simply 
avoiding the transfer of genes known to code for allergens does not solve the problem 
because “the characteristics of a protein with known allergenicity that would 
distinguish this protein from a protein unlikely to be allergenic are not known”). 
 16 See Joël Spiroux de Vendômois et al., A Comparison of the Effects of Three 
GM Corn Varieties on Mammalian Health, 5 INT’L J. BIOLOGICAL SCI. 706 (2009) 
(reporting signs of kidney and liver toxicity in rats that had been fed corn genetically 
modified to synthesize Bt toxins used as insecticides). 
 17 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, GENETICALLY MODIFIED PEST-PROTECTED 
PLANTS 69-73 (2000). 
 18 Katharine A. Van Tassel, Genetically Modified Plants Used for Food, Risk 
Assessment, and Uncertainty Principles: Does the Transition from Ignorance to 
Indeterminacy Trigger the Need for Post-Market Surveillance?, 15 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. 
L. 220, 230-37 (2009) (discussing recent discoveries indicating that genes function and 
interrelate in much more complex ways than previously understood). 
 19 Mandel, supra note 13, at 2194-98. 
 20 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 17, at 67. 
 21 See id. 
 22 See id. at 70-71. 
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substances are introduced into food crops.23 Genetically 
modified animals raise further concerns, including the 
potential for the transmission of new disease agents or for the 
escape of transgenic animals that could outcompete wild 
animal species and wreak havoc on ecosystems.24 
GMOs have become commonplace in U.S. agriculture 
and on American supermarket shelves despite surprisingly low 
public awareness and support. Only about one-fourth of the 
American public favors the introduction of GMOs into the food 
supply, and most Americans believe—incorrectly—that they 
have not ingested foods containing GMOs.25 Lax government 
oversight enabled the spread of GMOs notwithstanding public 
opposition and minimal consideration of health and 
environmental risks. GMOs are loosely governed under the 
Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology 
(“Framework”),26 established by the federal government in 1986 
with the ostensible purpose of regulating health and 
environmental risks that might result from the development, 
commercialization, and consumption of GMOs.27 A principal 
motivation behind the policy, however, was to “minimize the 
uncertainties and inefficiencies that [could] stifle innovation 
and impair the competitiveness” of the nascent biotechnology 
industry.28 Indeed, although the Framework is described as a 
“comprehensive federal regulatory policy,”29 it is better 
understood as a patchwork of existing laws pieced together to 
deflect calls for new legislation specifically addressing GMOs. 
The Framework identifies three primary agencies with 
authority under preexisting laws to regulate risks that 
biotechnology products might pose: the Animal and Plant 
Health Inspection Service, which monitors for plant-pest risks; 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which regulates 
pesticidal substances; and the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA), which regulates the safety and labeling of foods. Under 
  
 23 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF TRANSGENIC 
PLANTS: THE SCOPE AND ADEQUACY OF REGULATION 15, 68 (2002). 
 24 Mandel, supra note 13, at 2200-02. 
 25 See NAT’L SCI. FOUND., 1 SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS 2008, at 
7-36 (2008) (summarizing findings of surveys conducted by Pew Initiative on Food and 
Biotechnology). 
 26 Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 
23,302 (June 26, 1986) [hereinafter Framework]. 
 27 Proposal for a Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 49 
Fed. Reg. 50,856, 50,856-57 (Dec. 31, 1984). 
 28 Id. at 50,857. 
 29 Framework, 51 Fed. Reg. at 23,302. 
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the Framework, the agencies are directed to focus on the 
characteristics of the biotechnology product at issue—not the 
fact that a product was genetically engineered—and to regulate 
only those risks they deem unreasonable.30 The Framework 
does not require, however, comprehensive analyses of the 
health and environmental effects of individual GMOs or 
systematic consideration of the overall desirability of GMOs for 
society. In addition, the ad hoc nature of the Framework leaves 
significant regulatory gaps with respect to potential health and 
environmental risks.31 
The FDA’s regulation of GMOs in food exemplifies the 
piecemeal and relatively narrow scope of oversight under the 
Framework. The FDA’s authority with respect to GMOs derives 
from its more general authority over adulterated foods, 
including foods containing additives that are unsafe.32 
Accordingly, the FDA views its jurisdiction over GMOs as 
limited to genetically modified (GM) foods or food products.33 GM 
plants used to produce industrial chemicals, for example, receive 
no FDA review, and the FDA does not concern itself with 
environmental risks associated with the growing of GM crops.34 
Although food additives by and large must be approved 
by the FDA before use, a substance added to food is exempt if it 
is generally recognized as safe (GRAS).35 A genetic modification 
may create a substance that is considered a food additive. 
  
 30 Exercise of Federal Oversight Within Scope of Statutory Authority: 
Planned Introductions of Biotechnology Products into the Environment, 57 Fed. Reg. 
6753, 6756 (Feb. 27, 1992). 
 31 For detailed discussions and critiques of GMO oversight, see Mary Jane 
Angelo, Regulating Evolution for Sale: An Evolutionary Biology Model for Regulating 
the Unnatural Selection of Genetically Modified Organisms, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
93, 112-41 (2007), and Mandel, supra note 13, at 2221-42. 
 32 21 U.S.C. §§ 342(a)(2)(C), 348 (2006). The term adulterated food also 
includes “any poisonous or deleterious substance which may render it injurious to 
health,” id. § 342(a)(1), and the FDA has affirmed its authority to regulate GM foods 
containing toxicants through this provision. Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from 
New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984, 22,990 (May 29, 1992).  
 33 Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 
at 22,989-90. 
 34 See Rebecca Bratspies, Some Thoughts on the American Approach to 
Regulating Genetically Modified Organisms, 16 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 393, 408 n.70 
(2007). The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service is charged with assessing the 
environmental risks of growing GM crops, but its analyses, which focus on plant-pest 
risks, are seen as inadequate. Angelo, supra note 31, at 137. 
 35 21 U.S.C. § 348 (2006). Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, a 
food additive is defined as “any substance the intended use of which results . . . in its 
becoming a component or otherwise affecting the characteristics of any food . . . if such 
substance is not generally recognized . . . to be safe under the conditions of its intended 
use.” Id. § 321(s). 
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Under the FDA’s policy on GM foods, however, most GM foods 
require no premarket approval or special labeling.36 The policy, 
which provides that GM foods are to be treated no differently for 
regulatory purposes than foods developed through traditional 
plant breeding, presumes that most substances added to foods 
via genetic modification are GRAS because they “will be the 
same as or substantially similar to substances commonly found 
in food . . . .”37 As commentators have pointed out, the minimal 
oversight under the policy is further diluted by its self-policing 
nature: producers of new plant varieties make the GRAS 
determinations themselves.38 In fact, producers are not even 
required to report their GRAS determinations to the FDA, 
although they may do so of their own volition.39 The discretionary 
judgment involved in making and reporting GRAS determinations 
essentially makes the FDA’s regulatory scheme a voluntary one 
and reflects the Framework’s hands-off approach. 
b. Synthetic Biology 
The emerging field of synthetic biology builds on the 
techniques of conventional genetic engineering and hints at 
both a wider array of uses as well as more disturbing risks. 
Synthetic biology involves the synthesis of organic molecules 
not found in nature, with the aim of creating artificial living 
systems or of facilitating the assembly of living systems based 
on interchangeable genetic sequences.40 Unlike conventional 
genetic engineering, which relies on genetic material from 
existing organisms, synthetic biology entails the design of novel 
genetic sequences and even entire genomes.41 Synthetic biology 
  
 36 Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. at 
22,985; id. at 22,991 (declining to require disclosure of presence of GMOs in food labeling). 
 37 Id. at 22,985. 
 38 See Angelo, supra note 31, at 133; Mandel, supra note 13, at 2219. 
 39 21 C.F.R. § 170.35 (2010) (setting out procedure for voluntarily obtaining 
FDA affirmation of GRAS status); Substances Generally Recognized as Safe, 62 Fed. 
Reg. 18,938, 18,941 (Apr. 17, 1997) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 170, 184, 186, 570) 
(“[A] manufacturer may market a substance that the manufacturer determines is 
GRAS without informing the agency.”); Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New 
Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. at 22,989. 
 40 See Steven A. Benner & A. Michael Sismour, Synthetic Biology, 6 NATURE 
REVS. 533, 533 (2005); see also Paras Chopra & Akhil Kamma, Engineering Life 
Through Synthetic Biology, 6 IN SILICO BIOLOGY 401, 403 (2006) (“[W]e define 
Synthetic Biology as a field involving synthesis of novel biological systems which are 
not generally found in nature.”); Haseloff & Ajioka, supra note 5, at 1 (“Synthetic 
biology . . . seeks to employ engineering principles to reprogramme living systems.”).  
 41 See Philip Ball, Starting from Scratch, 431 NATURE 624, 625 (2004). 
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is at an early stage of development, with most research 
involving biological materials isolated from cells within 
laboratory settings.42 Scientists, however, are in the process of 
establishing standards for assembling DNA-based biological 
circuits and a legal framework for sharing standardized parts.43 
The ability to design new biological materials and 
chemicals through synthetic biology is expected to lead to the 
development of new drugs, drug delivery systems, biofuels, 
biosensors, and microbes that can digest wastes and 
environmental toxins.44 But synthesized forms of life also could 
have unpredictable effects if they are released or escape into 
the environment, and synthetic biology could even be deployed 
for nefarious purposes by bioterrorists.45 Such concerns are 
magnified by the possibility that synthetic biology experiments 
could become quite easy to conduct. The fear is that relatively 
untrained people may someday be able to use widely available 
materials to assemble their own custom-built life forms.46 
In a recent survey, researchers found that the large 
majority of the general public is in favor of greater public 
disclosure and government regulation of synthetic biology 
research.47 No regulations specific to synthetic biology, however, 
are yet in place.48 Rather, synthetic biology processes and 
  
 42 See id. at 626; W. Wayt Gibbs, Synthetic Life, SCI. AM., May 2004, at 75, 81. 
 43 See Haseloff & Ajioka, supra note 5, at 1; Jon Mooallem, Do-It-Yourself 
Genetic Engineering, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2010 (Magazine), at 40 (describing efforts to 
build an open-source genetic library containing more than 5000 BioBricks). 
 44 See Ball, supra note 41, at 625; Gibbs, supra note 42, at 75, 81; Steven 
Yearley, The Ethical Landscape: Identifying the Right Way to Think About the Ethical 
and Societal Aspects of Synthetic Biology Research and Products, 6 J. ROYAL SOC’Y 
INTERFACE S559 (2009), available at http://rsif.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/early/ 
2009/05/12/rsif.2009.0055.focus.full.pdf+html.  
 45 See Yearley, supra note 44, at 3. 
 46 See id. at 2 (comparing potential for informal experiments in synthetic 
biology to breakthroughs in information technology initiated in garages and other 
informal settings); Gibbs, supra note 42, at 81 (noting ease of access to information and 
synthetic DNA); Mooallem, supra note 43, at 40 (noting some synthetic biologists’ goal 
of enabling “the most sophisticated custom-built life forms [to] be assembled from a 
catalog of standardized parts”). 
 47 See HART RESEARCH ASSOCS., NANOTECHNOLOGY, SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY, & 
PUBLIC OPINION 16 (2009), available at http://www.nanotechproject.org/process/assets/ 
files/8286/nano_synbio.pdf (reporting that 90% of respondents believed that “more 
should be done to inform the public about this research” and that 66% of respondents 
agreed that the “federal government should regulate this research”). 
 48 See MICHAEL RODEMEYER, WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS, 
NEW LIFE, OLD BOTTLES: REGULATING FIRST-GENERATION PRODUCTS OF SYNTHETIC 
BIOLOGY 7-8 (2009), available at http://www.synbioproject.org/process/assets/files/6319/ 
nano_synbio2_electronic_final.pdf (noting that scientists have started to raise concerns 
about risks of synthetic biology research). 
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products are likely to be governed by the same haphazard 
scheme that applies to conventional genetic engineering.49 
2. Nanotechnology 
Nanotechnology, the science of manipulating matter at 
the nanometer scale,50 is an emerging suite of technologies with 
an even broader, more mind-boggling array of potential 
applications than genetic engineering. Hailed by some as the 
foundation for the “next industrial revolution,” nanotechnology 
offers the promise of precise manufacturing methods that are 
cleaner and more efficient than the relatively crude, top-down 
methods that dominate industrial processes today.51 
Nanomaterials are already being used in medical diagnosis and 
treatment, cosmetics, sunscreens, stain-resistant clothing, 
paints and coatings, electronics, tires, tennis rackets, and 
foods. In addition to these existing applications, researchers 
also expect to produce new materials that can be used as drug 
delivery devices and chemical catalysts or incorporated into 
self-cleaning surfaces and other products.52 With widespread 
commercialization on the near horizon, regulators are just 
beginning to grapple with the question of how to respond to 
nanotechnology’s potential health and environmental effects. 
Developing an approach for safe management of 
nanotechnology without unduly impeding innovation presents 
a daunting challenge. The health and environmental risks of 
nanotechnology are highly uncertain. Materials produced via 
nanotechnology are of interest because they often behave very 
differently from the conventional materials from which they are 
  
 49 See id. at 29-45 (reviewing potential applicability of existing laws and 
guidelines to synthetic biology); id. at 9 (characterizing new legislation specific to 
synthetic biology as “an unlikely option”). 
 50 THE ROYAL SOC’Y & THE ROYAL ACAD. OF ENG’G, NANOSCIENCE AND 
NANOTECHNOLOGIES: OPPORTUNITIES AND UNCERTAINTIES 5 (2004) [hereinafter ROYAL 
SOC’Y REPORT], available at http://www.nanotec.org.uk/finalReport.htm. 
 51 See Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, National 
Nanotechnology Initiative: Leading to the Next Industrial Revolution (Jan. 21, 2000), 
http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New/html/20000121_4.html; see also Barbara Karn, 
Overview of Environmental Applications and Implications, in NANOTECHNOLOGY AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT 2, 3 (Barbara Karn et al. eds., 2005). Top-down manufacturing 
involves the processing of a larger sample of raw material into a smaller item for use, 
whereas bottom-up methods build things on an atom-by-atom or molecule-by-molecule 
basis. See Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Nanotechnology and Regulatory Policy: Three 
Futures, 17 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 179, 181 (2003). 
 52 Albert C. Lin, Size Matters: Regulating Nanotechnology, 31 HARV. ENVTL. 
L. REV. 349, 353-54 (2007). 
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derived. Their small size, chemical composition, surface 
structure, solubility, shape, and aggregative tendencies also may 
make them particularly detrimental when taken into the body.53 
Nonetheless, health and environmental effects of exposure to 
nanomaterials have not been extensively studied, and the 
expected proliferation of nanotechnology materials and 
applications complicates efforts to draw generalizations 
regarding any such effects.54 Future advances in nanotechnology 
could incorporate self-replicating capacities—that is, processing 
and fabrication mechanisms that would enable nanomachines to 
reproduce themselves in a process akin to cell division—and may 
pose even greater and more unpredictable threats.55 
According to one estimate, over one thousand 
nanotechnology consumer products have now been brought to 
market,56 yet most Americans remain unfamiliar with 
nanotechnology.57 Once people are given basic information 
about it, they tend to form positive impressions and to expect 
that its benefits will outweigh its risks.58 Nonetheless, surveys 
also suggest serious public concerns about unknown effects and 
  
 53 See, e.g., ROYAL SOC’Y REPORT, supra note 50, at 41-42; Andre Nel et al., 
Toxic Potential of Materials at the Nanolevel, 311 SCIENCE 622 (2006); Günter 
Oberdörster et al., Nanotoxicology: An Emerging Discipline Evolving from Studies of 
Ultrafine Particles, 113 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 823, 824 (2005); Craig A. Poland et al., 
Carbon Nanotubes Introduced into the Abdominal Cavity of Mice Show Asbestos-Like 
Pathogenicity in a Pilot Study, 3 NATURE NANOTECHNOLOGY 423 (2008); Benedicte 
Trouiller et al., Titanium Dioxide Nanoparticles Induce DNA Damage and Genetic 
Instability In Vivo in Mice, 69 CANCER RESEARCH 8784 (2009) (finding systemic genetic 
damage in mice exposed to titanium dioxide nanoparticles—which are widely used in 
cosmetics, sunscreen, and paint). 
 54 See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 620/K-09/011, NANOMATERIAL RESEARCH 
STRATEGY 11, 20-21 (2009), available at http://www.epa.gov/nanoscience (listed in 
“Resources” menu on right-hand side) (discussing issues to be researched); Lin, supra 
note 52, at 357-58. 
 55 See Lin, supra note 52, at 355. 
 56 Analysis, PROJECT ON EMERGING NANOTECHNOLOGIES, http://www. 
nanotechproject.org/inventories/consumer/analysis_draft (last visited Jan. 19, 2011) 
(“As of August 25, 2009, the nanotechnology consumer products inventory contains 
1015 products or product lines.”). 
 57 NAT’L SCI. FOUND., supra note 25, at 7-38; DAN M. KAHAN ET AL., 
WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS, NANOTECHNOLOGY RISK PERCEPTIONS: 
THE INFLUENCE OF AFFECT AND VALUES 2 (2007), available at http://www. 
nanotechproject.org/process/assets/files/2710/164_nanotechriskperceptions_dankahan.p
df (reporting that 81% of survey respondents had heard “nothing at all” or “just a little” 
about nanotechnology prior to survey). 
 58 See JANE MACOUBRIE, WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS, INFORMED 
PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF NANOTECHNOLOGY AND TRUST IN GOVERNMENT 8 (2005), available 
at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Nanotechnologies/ 
Nanotech_0905.pdf. Subsequent research suggests that reactions to nanotechnology 
depend in large part on a person’s underlying values. See KAHAN ET AL., supra note 57, 
at 1-2, 5.  
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potential health risks.59 Participants in various studies have 
expressed not only a desire for information about such risks, 
but also a desire to be involved in decision making regarding 
nanotechnology development.60 
Despite public unease, nanotechnology remains largely 
unregulated. The EPA has the authority to regulate chemical 
substances under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). 
However, the agency has taken the position that the molecular 
identity of a substance, and not particle size, is critical to 
determining whether a nanoscale substance is a new material 
subject to the new chemical reporting requirements found in 
section 5 of TSCA.61 Thus, even though a nanoscale substance 
“may differ in certain physical and/or chemical properties 
resulting from the difference in particle size, the EPA considers 
the two forms to be the same chemical substance because they 
have the same molecular identity.”62 The EPA does possess 
authority under section 6 of TSCA to regulate substances 
classified as “existing” rather than “new.”63 That provision, 
however, places such heavy evidentiary burdens on the EPA 
that it is unlikely to be applied to nanoscale substances.64 The 
EPA has expressed its intent to develop rules under TSCA to 
gather information on nanomaterial production, use, and 
exposure and to develop health and safety data.65 Yet regulators 
face daunting challenges in terms of the present lack of such 
data and the expanding universe of nanoscale substances found 
in research labs and the marketplace.66 
  
 59 See MACOUBRIE, supra note 58, at 10. 
 60 See id. at 3-4, 14; PATRICK HAMLETT ET AL., NATIONAL CITIZENS’ 
TECHNOLOGY FORUM: NANOTECHNOLOGIES AND HUMAN ENHANCEMENT 2 (2008), 
available at http://cns.asu.edu/cns-library/type/?action=getfile&file=88&section=lib. 
 61 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, TSCA INVENTORY STATUS OF NANOSCALE 
SUBSTANCES—GENERAL APPROACH 2 (2008), available at http://www.epa.gov/oppt/ 
nano/nmsp-inventorypaper2008.pdf. Certain classes of nanoscale substances, such as 
pesticides containing nanomaterials, may be subject to regulation under narrower 
statutes, including the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). 
See Lynn L. Bergeson, FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel Considers Nanosilver, 39 
ENVTL. L. REP. 11, 143-44 (2009); Lin, supra note 52, at 371-74. 
 62 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 61, at 6. 
 63 15 U.S.C. § 2605 (2006). 
 64 See J. CLARENCE DAVIES, WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS, 
OVERSIGHT OF NEXT GENERATION NANOTECHNOLOGY 21 (2009), available at 
http://207.58.186.238/process/assets/files/7316/pen-18.pdf; Lin, supra note 52, at 362-67 
(discussing difficulties in applying TSCA). 
 65 Sixty-Fourth Report of the TSCA Interagency Testing Committee to the 
Administrator of the EPA, 74 Fed. Reg. 38,878, 38,880 (Aug. 4, 2009). 
 66 See Lin, supra note 52, at 357-61. 
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3. Geoengineering 
Geoengineering refers to proposed planetary-scale 
techniques to limit or avoid the consequences of higher 
greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the Earth’s 
atmosphere.67 These techniques include the release of aerosols 
into the stratosphere to block a substantial fraction of the sun’s 
radiation and the mass fertilization of the oceans to increase 
the uptake of carbon by phytoplankton.68 The term usually does 
not encompass techniques for reducing GHG emissions or 
capturing such emissions before they are released into the 
environment (such as carbon capture and sequestration), nor is 
it typically applied to tree-planting and other efforts to enhance 
terrestrial carbon sinks.69 Unlike these more conventional 
approaches, geoengineering proposals are highly controversial 
because of the grave risks and uncertainties involved, as well as 
the grand scale of any contemplated operations to deliberately 
alter the Earth’s climate system. Geoengineering efforts could 
have unexpected effects on precipitation patterns, atmospheric 
quality, and ecosystems, and such efforts would not necessarily 
address all the effects of increased GHG concentrations.70 
Although reducing GHG emissions is widely recognized 
as the preferred means of responding to climate change, 
geoengineering has attracted growing attention as a possible 
emergency or complementary response, given the difficulties, 
complexities, and costs involved in reducing emissions 
directly.71 At present, no full-scale geoengineering projects have 
been undertaken, and research efforts have primarily involved 
computer modeling rather than field testing.72 Yet even 
experimentation with geoengineering techniques could create a 
  
 67 See Albert C. Lin, Geoengineering Governance, 8 ISSUES LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 
1, 2 (2009), available at http://www.bepress.com/ils/vol8/iss3/art2. 
 68 Id. at 3-7. 
 69 David W. Keith, Geoengineering, 409 NATURE 420, 420 (2001). 
 70 Lin, supra note 67, at 4-6. The release of aerosols to block some of the sun’s 
radiation, for instance, would do nothing to counter the increasing acidity of the oceans 
caused by higher levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. 
 71 See, e.g., Alan Carlin, Why a Different Approach Is Required If Global 
Climate Change Is to Be Controlled Efficiently or Even at All, 32 WM. & MARY ENVTL. 
L. & POL’Y REV. 685, 706-07 (2008); P.J. Crutzen, Albedo Enhancement by Stratospheric 
Sulfur Injections: A Contribution to Resolve a Policy Dilemma?, 77 CLIMATIC CHANGE 
211, 217 (2006) (expressing preference for emissions reductions, but suggesting that 
alternative responses be researched). 
 72 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-903, CLIMATE CHANGE: A 
COORDINATED STRATEGY COULD FOCUS FEDERAL GEOENGINEERING RESEARCH AND 
INFORM GOVERNANCE EFFORTS 13-15 (2010). 
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moral hazard that would undermine emissions-reduction 
efforts and could foster the growth of interest groups that 
would have strong incentives to advocate for geoengineering 
projects.73 Because such experiments may affect millions of 
people—if not every person on Earth—experimentation on even 
a modest scale would demand some form of informed consent.74 
No international treaty directly governs geoengineering at this 
time.75 Ideally, if a full-blown geoengineering project were 
carried out, it would take place as a cooperative effort following 
a consensual decision-making process by the international 
community. The logistics and costs of some geoengineering 
techniques, however, are such that a single nation—or even a 
wealthy individual—could undertake a geoengineering project 
on its own.76 Finding ways to manage the uncertainties raised 
by various geoengineering techniques while accounting for 
ethical concerns poses yet another daunting technology 
challenge for society.  
B. Goals in Technology Management 
1. Assessment 
Because emerging technologies can drastically 
transform society and the environment, such technologies 
should be carefully assessed and subjected to public input. 
Technological change does not occur on its own. Technology 
management is possible because technologies are a product of 
human discovery, choice, and policy. This is not to suggest, 
however, that society can exert complete control over 
technologies and their effects. Even technologies that are 
subject to close scrutiny before and during implementation can 
give rise to unanticipated consequences. Once introduced, 
technologies enter into a dynamic relationship with societies 
that shapes and transforms societies themselves.77 Accordingly, 
the formative and continuing influence of technologies on 
  
 73 David R. Morrow et al., Toward Ethical Norms and Institutions for Climate 
Engineering Research, 4 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 45,106, § 3 (2009).  
 74 See id. at 4-5 (discussing principle of respect for individual autonomy as 
basis for requirement to obtain consent for geoengineering experiments). 
 75 See Daniel Bodansky, May We Engineer the Climate?, 33 CLIMATIC 
CHANGE 309, 311-16 (1996). 
 76 See Lin, supra note 67, at 12. 
 77 See COLLINGRIDGE, supra note 1, at 19 (discussing “the dilemma of control” 
of technology). 
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humans and the environment generates a need for robust 
mechanisms to predict, evaluate, and govern their development. 
This is especially so in light of the often irreversible and global 
nature of the hazards associated with modern technologies.78 
The practice of technology assessment came into being 
in the 1970s with the ambition of analyzing the full range of 
consequences—social, environmental, and otherwise—that a 
technology may have.79 Technology assessment was to involve 
objective analysis drawing on the natural and social sciences; 
subjective value judgments were to be left to democratically 
elected officials.80 A fundamental premise underlying technology 
assessment was that through the application of comprehensive 
rationality, society could effectively manage—if not solve—many 
of its problems.81 Although this faith in rational analysis and 
control was overly optimistic, the underlying motivation—to 
develop and manage technologies in a more deliberate manner—
remains critical. In recent years, refinements to technology 
assessment have sought ways to incorporate public values into 
the assessment process and to encourage greater self-reflection 
within the scientific community.82 
Risk assessment is a central component of technology 
assessment.83 Risk assessment seeks to produce quantitative 
estimates of the probability and magnitude of potential harms 
from an activity or occurrence—such as the adoption of a new 
technology—based on available data.84 The risk assessment 
process generates a risk characterization, which ideally includes a 
range of estimates to quantify identified hazards, as well as a 
discussion of the degree of confidence with which estimates are 
made, uncertainties in the analysis, and underlying assumptions.85 
  
 78 Cf. BECK, supra note 4, at 21-23 (describing distinct characteristics of 
modern risks). 
 79 See Laurence H. Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth 
Discontinuity: The Limits of Instrumental Rationality, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 617, 621-22 
(1973); see also RON WESTRUM, TECHNOLOGIES & SOCIETY: THE SHAPING OF PEOPLE 
AND THINGS 325 (1991) (defining technology assessment as “an attempt to predict what 
the effects of a technology will be if it is implemented”). 
 80 See Norman J. Vig & Herbert Paschen, Technology Assessment in 
Comparative Perspective, in PARLIAMENTS AND TECHNOLOGY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT IN EUROPE 3, 8 (Norman J. Vig & Herbert Paschen eds., 2000). 
 81 See Tribe, supra note 79, at 622. 
 82 See infra Part III. 
 83 See Frank Fischer, Are Scientists Irrational? Risk Assessment in Practical 
Reason, in SCIENCE AND CITIZENS: GLOBALIZATION & THE CHALLENGE OF ENGAGEMENT 
54, 54 (Melissa Leach et al. eds., 2005). 
 84 See HOLLY DOREMUS ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LAW 395 (5th ed. 2008). 
 85 See id. at 398. 
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Technology assessment can involve other predictive techniques in 
addition to risk assessment, such as mathematical modeling, 
technological forecasting, and scenario building.86 
These technical analyses, of course, cannot provide all 
the data necessary to make perfectly informed decisions. Even 
the relatively well-developed practice of risk assessment has 
significant limitations. Although risk assessment can identify 
some hazards as well as options for coping with them,87 risk 
quantification often involves rough probability estimates whose 
confidence intervals may vary by a degree of magnitude or 
more.88 There are some hazards, moreover, that simply cannot be 
quantified because of insufficient data or the inability to perform 
useful experiments.89 And beyond that, there are other hazards—
“unknown unknowns”—that cannot be identified because of 
limitations in understanding, stochastic processes, and the 
inherent unpredictability of interactions between society and 
technology.90 Decisions regarding technology must take these 
uncertainties into account, even if they cannot be well articulated. 
These points lead to a more fundamental criticism of 
risk assessment. The quantitative analyses fostered by risk 
assessments tend to crowd out from debate qualitative factors 
and other pertinent considerations that are less amenable to 
scientific characterization.91 In other words, the “technical 
rationality” of risk assessment, which focuses on scientific 
measurement, can differ quite dramatically from the “cultural 
  
 86 See WESTRUM, supra note 79, at 328-29. 
 87 See E. J. Woodhouse, Toward More Usable Technology Policy Analyses, in 
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND POLITICS: POLICY ANALYSIS IN CONGRESS 13, 16 (Gary C. 
Bryner ed., 1992). 
 88 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT 
165-66 (1994) (criticizing overreliance on “artificially precise single estimates of risk”). 
 89 Id. at 165 (discussing sources of uncertainty); Albert C. Lin, The Unifying 
Role of Harm in Environmental Law, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 897, 968-69. 
 90 Elizabeth Fisher et al., Understanding Environmental Models in Their 
Legal and Regulatory Context, 22 J. ENVTL. L. 251, 271-72 (2010) (“[I]rreducible 
ignorance about a complex system will always be an inherent feature of modeling.”); 
Helena Valve & Jussi Kauppila, Enacting Closure in the Environmental Control of 
Genetically Modified Organisms, 20 J. ENVTL. L. 339, 353 (2008). 
 91 See BECK, supra note 4, at 71 (criticizing assumption of scientific rationality 
“that so long as risks are not recognized scientifically, they do not exist—at least not 
legally, medically, technologically, or socially, and they are thus not prevented, treated or 
compensated for”); SHEILA JASANOFF, DESIGNS ON NATURE: SCIENCE AND DEMOCRACY IN 
EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 265 (2005) (“In the United States, a preferred method 
for displaying objectivity in public decisions has been to clothe the reasons for allocative 
choices as far as possible in the language of numbers.”). 
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rationality” often reflected in the attitudes of nonscientists.92 
Cultural rationality considers not only quantifiable effects in 
the decision-making process, but also contextual factors such 
as personal experience and social values.93 While thorough 
technical analysis is important to sound technology 
management, finding ways to incorporate social values and 
other concerns is critical as well. 
2. Public Participation 
In its conventional form, technology assessment 
assumed a linear model of technology development in which 
basic research is followed by applied research and then 
production. Technology assessment focused on objective 
analysis of virtually finished technologies and did little to 
involve the public or to account for the values that society 
holds. Technology assessors, in other words, were in charge of 
providing technical knowledge, leaving the judgments and 
decisions based on that knowledge to others.94 
Public participation in technology management is 
essential as a matter of democratic governance and as a means 
of informing substantive choices with public values.95 Because 
technology shapes both society as a whole and the lives of each 
individual, the public must have a meaningful role in 
technology management, including technology assessment, as a 
matter of basic autonomy.96 Under the traditional liberal view 
  
 92 See MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY 
ON THE SELECTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS 7-9 (1982); 
Fischer, supra note 83, at 55; Alonzo Plough & Sheldon Krimsky, The Emergence of 
Risk Communication Studies: Social and Political Context, 12 SCI., TECH., & HUMAN 
VALUES, Summer/Fall 1987, at 4, 8-9.  
 93 Fischer, supra note 83, at 55; Plough & Krimsky, supra note 92, at 8-9.  
 94 See MARK B. BROWN, SCIENCE IN DEMOCRACY: EXPERTISE, INSTITUTIONS, 
AND REPRESENTATION 86 (2009) (discussing approaches “in which experts determine 
the means of politics and citizens choose the ends” or that make “a parallel distinction 
between technical knowledge and political judgment”); see also Tribe, supra note 79, at 
657-59 (discussing potential for “our technological choices [to] define what we become”). 
 95 See Andy Stirling, Opening Up or Closing Down? Analysis, Participation 
and Power in the Social Appraisal of Technology, in SCIENCE AND CITIZENS: 
GLOBALIZATION & THE CHALLENGE OF ENGAGEMENT, supra note 83, at 218, 220 
(discussing rationales for public participation in science and technology matters). 
 96 Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, Evaluating the Expertise of Experts, 6 RISK: 
HEALTH, SAFETY & ENV’T 115, 117 (1995) (arguing for right of public participation in 
risk assessments because they have consequences for public welfare). As Andy Stirling 
has pointed out, the narrow involvement and “opaque technical procedures associated 
with expert analysis . . . conflict with Habermasian principles of ‘ideal speech’ [and] 
with Rawlsian notions of ‘public reason.’” Stirling, supra note 95, at 221. See generally 
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION VOL. 1: REASON AND THE 
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of democratic processes, citizens hold natural rights, including 
a right of liberty and a right against excessive government 
control.97 Public participation in technology development, 
assessment, and management is rooted in the protection and 
expression of these rights and derives support from general 
normative principles of social justice, democratic emancipation, 
and equality.98 The contemporary democratic notions of public 
reason and ideal speech reflect the principle that policy makers 
should engage as broad an array of societal interests as 
possible.99 Such engagement seeks to ensure that policy 
decisions affecting society as a whole—including those 
decisions regarding new technologies—are not reduced to the 
agenda of dominant political and economic institutions or a 
small group of elites. Greater public participation in such 
decisions reflects a commitment to the empowerment of 
citizens, no matter how ideologically or economically 
marginalized they might be.100 
Integrating public participation into decisions about 
technology is also critical because public values anchor relevant 
societal preferences about technology in terms of tolerance for 
risk and uncertainty, desire for change, and willingness to 
  
RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY 25 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984); John Rawls, The 
Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765 (1997). 
 97 See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 374-81 (Peter Laslett 
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1968) (1689) (discussing how assertion of negative rights 
brings with it protection from government intervention and an opportunity for 
individuals to assert private interests, which aggregate to inform the political will and 
impact administrative institutions). 
 98 See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE POSTNATIONAL CONSTELLATION: POLITICAL 
ESSAYS 62-69, 76, 110-18 (Max Pensky ed. & trans., MIT Press 2001) (1998) (contrasting 
liberal and conservative notions of democratic politics and the effects of globalization, and 
providing normative justifications for public participation in decision making).  
 99 See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 86, 98-
101, 363-73 (Thomas McCarthy trans., Polity 1987) (1984) (discussing an “ideal speech 
situation” in which every competent actor has a right to participate in societal 
discourse and is permitted to introduce any assertion into that discourse without 
hindrance or coercion); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 7, 9, 214-20 (1996) 
(propounding “public reason” as an ideal mode of deliberation for issues of public concern 
in a pluralist society, and contending that an “overlapping consensus” can be reached 
through recognition of a core set of substantive moral principles common to a 
“reasonable” fragment of society). See generally JÜRGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS 
17-24, 95-111 (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1975) (advocating a universal 
pragmatism requiring preacknowledgment among participants that the existence of an 
ideal speech situation is possible, and that participants engaged in competent discourse 
can reach a consensus that is representative of the general will of the public). 
 100 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 106-14 (1971) (arguing that “fair 
and equal opportunity” requires that positions of influence be distributed based on 
merit and that all persons have reasonable opportunity to acquire the skills upon 
which merits are assessed). 
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make tradeoffs. In theory, decisions by elected officials in a 
representative democracy can reflect public values and 
concerns. Indeed, the assumption that political representatives 
possess a particular competence to make decisions that are in 
the public interest and consistent with public values is 
foundational to the liberal theory of representative 
government.101 With respect to technology matters, however, 
representation of the public is often inadequate. Factors that 
systematically bias the lawmaking process against focusing on 
the potential risks of new technologies include the pressures on 
politicians to respond to current headlines and regular election 
cycles rather than on issues with distant time horizons, such as 
the health or environmental consequences of emerging 
technologies;102 the specialized body of knowledge necessary to 
understand science and technology issues—a knowledge that 
few legislators possess;103 and the substantial uncertainty 
surrounding health and environmental risks, which generally 
leads to inaction rather than the adoption of precautionary 
measures.104 In addition, public choice theory predicts that 
legislatures will cater to the interests of an organized and vocal 
minority at the expense of a majority whose interests are more 
diffuse.105 This dynamic is especially pronounced with emerging 
technologies, which tend to have vigorous corporate or 
institutional advocates but little opposition from a public 
largely unaware of a technology or its potential risks.106 These 
  
 101 See BROWN, supra note 94, at 78-85; THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 320 
(James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (noting “how salutary will be the interference 
of some temperate and respectable body of citizens, in order to check” the potential for 
misguided and rash decisions by the general public). 
 102 See Gary C. Bryner, Science, Technology, and Policy Analysis in Congress: 
An Introduction, in SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND POLITICS, supra note 87, at 3, 6; L. 
Christopher Plein & David J. Webber, The Role of Technology Assessment in 
Congressional Consideration of Biotechnology, in SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND 
POLITICS, supra note 87, at 123, 147. 
 103 See M. Granger Morgan & Jon M. Peha, Analysis, Governance, and the 
Need for Better Institutional Arrangements, in SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ADVICE FOR 
CONGRESS 3, 11 (M. Granger Morgan & Jon M. Peha eds., 2003); Michael Rodemeyer, Back to 
the Future: Revisiting OTA Ten Years Later, in MICHAEL RODEMEYER ET AL., WOODROW 
WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS, THE FUTURE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 3 (2005), 
available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/news/docs/techassessment.pdf. 
 104 See Lin, supra note 89, at 898-99. 
 105 Cynthia R. Farina & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Foreword: Post-Public Choice?, 
87 CORNELL L. REV. 267, 268 (2002). 
 106 See ALLAN SCHNAIBERG, THE ENVIRONMENT: FROM SURPLUS TO SCARCITY 
131 (1980) (contending that “[i]n the absence of a public sector debate over ‘science 
policy,’ piecemeal decisions made in the U.S. continuously supported an exponential 
increase in energy-intensive production” and in production of synthetic and novel 
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obstacles to the expression of public values through ordinary 
channels of representation are an important justification for 
more direct public participation in technology matters. 
When the government does attend to the hazards of 
emerging technologies, the empirical techniques of risk 
assessment and risk-benefit analysis often dominate its policies 
to the detriment of public preferences.107 Technically, risk 
management—the values-driven, policy-making process of 
deciding how to respond to risk data—can be distinguished 
from risk assessment—the expert-driven process of identifying, 
analyzing, and quantifying risks.108 Notwithstanding this 
distinction, risk managers often defer to the quantitative data 
of risk assessment (or the lack of such data) in deciding how to 
respond to the hazards posed by new technologies.109 Because 
empirical techniques fail to account for all of the factors 
relevant to social decision making, however, an approach 
centered on quantifiable risks elides difficult, values-based 
choices under a veneer of objectivity. Indeed, the act of 
engaging in the discourse of risk through the risk management 
process reinforces the sometimes dubious assumption that risk 
can be understood, measured, and managed effectively.110 
Moreover, although risk assessment is often characterized 
as a purely scientific, values-free undertaking, the values of 
those performing a risk assessment necessarily influence the 
assumptions made, inferences drawn, and calculations performed 
in an assessment.111 Questions regarding how to deal with the 
uncertainty inherent in risk assessment are questions of policy, 
  
chemicals). The widespread adoption of GMOs despite public opposition or ignorance 
illustrates this tendency. See supra Part I.A.1.a. 
 107 See Fischer, supra note 83, at 54; Brian Wynne, Risk and Environment as 
Legitimatory Discourses of Technology: Reflexivity Inside Out?, 50 CURRENT SOCIOLOGY 
459, 460 (2002) (“Risk has become the form of public discourse through which public 
meaning is given to technology and innovation . . . .”). 
 108 See DOREMUS ET AL., supra note 84, at 395-99. 
 109 See Melissa Leach & Ian Scoones, Science and Citizenship in Global 
Context, in SCIENCE AND CITIZENS, supra note 83 at 15, 22 (“Liberal understandings of 
citizenship . . . hold faith in the modern state’s expertise [and] defer decisions to elected 
elites, who historically have been highly reliant on accredited scientific and 
technocratic expertise.”). 
 110 See Wynne, supra note 107, at 468-69; see also Baruch Fischhoff, Public 
Values in Risk Research, 545 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 75, 77 (1996) 
(describing origins of risk research in industry efforts to manage internal affairs and 
suggesting that risk analysis continues to “address[] the problems and speak[] the 
language of industry”). 
 111 Shrader-Frechette, supra note 96, at 116; see also BECK, supra note 4, at 29 
(“[O]ne must assume an ethical point of view in order to discuss risks meaningfully at 
all.”); Paul Slovic, The Risk Game, 86 J. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 17, 19-22 (2001). 
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not of science.112 Emerging technologies tend to involve highly 
uncertain consequences.113 When decisions must be made in the 
face of uncertainty, reliance on beliefs, values, and experiences 
is rational and appropriate.114 Incorporating greater public 
participation and discourse into technology assessment, 
including risk assessment, is essential for this reason. Lay 
citizens may have limited knowledge on technical matters,115 
but nonetheless, they can dialogue effectively with experts and 
play an important role in bringing public values into the 
technology assessment process.116 Ultimately, rational debate 
involving citizens, experts, and other interested parties can 
lead to an expansion of relevant considerations or to the 
development of consensus regarding the common good.117 
In sum, technology assessment, once characterized as 
the exclusive province of experts, can and should be opened up 
to public participation. Part III.B considers ways of doing so in 
greater detail. This broader and more open assessment process 
should occur during rather than after technology development, 
bringing public concerns into research decisions and technology 
design.118 Ongoing public participation can make the decision 
  
 112 Shrader-Frechette, supra note 96, at 117; see also Stirling, supra note 95, 
at 224 (noting that “probability theory underlies the entire activity of risk assessment, 
yet its applicability is seriously constrained by recognition of intractable states of 
uncertainty, indeterminacy and ignorance”). 
 113 COLLINGRIDGE, supra note 1, at 16-18 (discussing the broad and 
unexpected consequences of the popularization of the automobile). 
 114 LARS KLÜVER ET AL., EUROPEAN PARTICIPATORY TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 
173 (2000), available at http://www.tekno.dk/pdf/projekter/europta_Report.pdf (observing 
that “the inequalities and uncertainties attached to scientific-technological 
developments . . . call[] for more inclusive social policy analysis and decision-making”); 
Fischer, supra note 83, at 59 (“As the move to basic cultural orientations is in significant 
part a response to the fact that science cannot supply the needed answers, it is thus 
anything but irrational.”); Shrader-Frechette, supra note 96, at 117 (discussing reasons 
supporting the public’s right to participate in risk assessments). 
 115 Laypersons nevertheless can contribute greater breadth and depth of 
knowledge to objective assessments. See Stirling, supra note 95, at 222. 
 116 BROWN, supra note 94, at 233-34 (contending that laypersons possess a 
range of experiences and knowledge, as well as an ability to become knowledgeable 
through deliberation); Daniel Lee Kleinman, Beyond the Science Wars: Contemplating 
the Democratization of Science, 17 POLITICS & LIFE SCI. 133, 139 (1998) (discussing 
examples of informed participation by laypersons in scientific and technical dialogues). 
 117 See HABERMAS, supra note 96, at 25; Leach & Scoones, supra note 109, at 
24. Care must be taken in the design of participatory processes, however, to guard 
against the potential for simply reinforcing existing power relations. See Leach & 
Scoones, supra note 109, at 25; Stirling, supra note 95, at 225-26 (discussing framing 
effects on technical analyses and participatory deliberation). 
 118 See Frank Fischer, Technological Deliberation in a Democratic Society: The 
Case for Participatory Inquiry, 26 SCI. & PUB. POL’Y 294, 297 (1999). 
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process more democratic, improve the quality of analysis, and 
facilitate public acceptance of resulting decisions.119 
II. OUR EXPERIENCE WITH TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT AND 
PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT 
Efforts in the United States to evaluate and manage 
technology’s consequences fall into three basic categories: 
formal technology assessment, which was practiced previously 
by the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) and is practiced 
occasionally by other government agencies; environmental 
impact assessment, which focuses on the potential health and 
environmental effects of policy choices and serves as a form of 
technology assessment when applied to technology policy 
decisions; and nonregulatory assessment, which is carried out by 
technology developers themselves or by other nongovernmental 
entities. This Part surveys these efforts and finds that they fall 
short in advancing the assessment and public participatory 
functions that technology assessment should achieve. 
A. Formal Technology Assessment 
1. The Office of Technology Assessment 
The very concept of technology assessment arose as 
“critical voices within science began calling for preassessment 
before committing society to innovations such as supersonic 
transport and nuclear weapons.”120 In the United States, 
Congress created the OTA in 1972 to provide objective analyses 
to inform policy decisions on technology matters. While the 
OTA earned the respect of many for the quality of its work on 
issues ranging from the feasibility of the Star Wars missile 
defense system to the cleanup of nuclear-weapons 
laboratories,121 it ultimately played no more than a modest role 
in influencing how the United States handles new technologies. 
  
 119 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING RISK: INFORMING DECISIONS 
IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 23-24 (Paul C. Stern & Harvey V. Fineberg eds., 1996); 
Slovic, supra note 111, at 23. 
 120 CLINTON S. ANDREWS, HUMBLE ANALYSIS: THE PRACTICE OF JOINT FACT-
FINDING 48 (2002). 
 121 See Robert M. Margolis & David H. Guston, The Origins, Accomplishments, 
and Demise of the Office of Technology Assessment, in SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
ADVICE FOR CONGRESS, supra note 103, at 53, 66; Paul Recer, Office of Technology 
Assessment Killed, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), Sept. 27, 1995, at 2C. 
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The OTA’s official mission was “to provide early 
indications of the probable beneficial and adverse impacts of the 
applications of technology and to develop other coordinate 
information which may assist the Congress.”122 In creating the 
OTA, Congress was motivated by several factors, including its 
need for an independent source of technical information and 
objective analyses, a rise in government spending on scientific 
research and development, and growing social unease regarding 
the negative effects of science and technology.123 The statute 
establishing the OTA declared, “As technology continues to 
change and expand rapidly, its applications are . . . increasingly 
extensive, pervasive, and critical in their impact, beneficial and 
adverse, on the natural and social environment.”124 
Although the OTA originally was to perform long-term 
analyses regarding entire technological fields, technology 
assessment at the OTA was fairly constricted in practice. 
Congress’s requests for information tended to emphasize 
specific subjects and to require rapid responses, and short-
term, narrow policy analyses eventually came to dominate the 
OTA’s workload.125 In an effort to maintain credibility and avoid 
alienating members of Congress who might disagree with its 
conclusions,126 the agency generally avoided making 
recommendations and instead confined itself to surveys of the 
technical components of the issues.127 More significantly, 
technology assessment came to be understood not as a process, 
but as a product—the reports generated by the OTA.128 These 
developments are not surprising given the OTA’s subordinate 
role and limited mandate. The OTA had no regulatory power 
and, in practice, limited advisory power. Nevertheless, the OTA 
never fulfilled its potential to study technological applications 
  
 122 2 U.S.C. § 472(c) (2006). 
 123 See Margolis & Guston, supra note 121, at 53, 54-57. 
 124 2 U.S.C. § 471(a) (2006). 
 125 See Margolis & Guston, supra note 121, at 59; Vig & Paschen, supra note 80, at 9. 
 126 See Nancy Carson, Process, Prescience, and Pragmatism: The Office of 
Technology Assessment, in ORGANIZATIONS FOR POLICY ANALYSIS: HELPING 
GOVERNMENT THINK 236, 243 (Carol H. Weiss ed., 1992). 
 127 ANDREWS, supra note 120, at 181 (“OTA consciously chose to minimize 
normative content in its work. Instead, OTA strove to make its work useful to decision 
makers representing diverse perspectives, and who often did not share the same 
values.”); Carson, supra note 126, at 249; Daniel Sarewitz, This Won’t Hurt a Bit: 
Assessing and Governing Rapidly Advancing Technologies in a Democracy, in 
RODEMEYER ET AL., supra note 103; SCLOVE, supra note 1, at 10-11.  
 128 See Margolis & Guston, supra note 121, at 61-62, 71-72; Vig & Paschen, 
supra note 80, at 9-10. 
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and consequences in a broader and more systematic way, or to 
transform how Congress and society relate to technology.129 
Ultimately, the OTA was unable to maintain the difficult 
balancing act of providing objective information to Congress 
while securing political support for its continued existence. 
Shortly after the Republican takeover of Congress in 1994, 
Congress eliminated the agency as part of the new majority’s 
promise to enact its “Contract with America.”130 Among the 
primary reasons given for eliminating the agency was its slow 
pace relative to Congress’s timetables.131 Because the OTA’s 
assessments could take one to two years to complete, they often 
failed to meet the more pressing political needs of Congress’s 
members.132 Also contributing to the OTA’s elimination were 
accusations of bias—whether justified or not—often from parties 
whose interests were undermined by the OTA’s reports.133 
America’s experiment with formal technology 
assessment through an agency dedicated to the task came to an 
end with the demise of the OTA. The need for technology 
assessment and deliberate management of technology, 
however, has not diminished. To the contrary, that need is ever 
greater in an era of rapidly developing technologies with 
widespread and long-lasting impacts. 
2. Institutional Alternatives to the OTA 
In the OTA’s absence, a number of governmental 
institutions do have some capacity to carry out technology 
assessment. Such assessments, however, have been performed 
on a narrow and ad hoc basis, if at all, and their scope and 
impact have been limited by traditional and legal constraints.134 
  
 129 Vig & Paschen, supra note 80, at 9 (“[OTA’s] reports gradually shifted from 
technology-driven topics to more problem-focused studies that were less distinctive 
from traditional policy analyses than originally envisaged.”). 
 130 See Margolis & Guston, supra note 121, at 70-71. Congress eliminated all 
funding for OTA, but did not formally abolish the agency. Legislative Branch 
Appropriations Act, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-53, 109 Stat. 468 (1995). Subsequent efforts 
to revive the agency with renewed funding have not succeeded. See Bruce L.R. Smith & 
Jeffrey K. Stine, Technical Advice for Congress: Past Trends and Present Obstacles, in 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ADVICE FOR CONGRESS, supra note 103, at 23, 40. 
 131 See Margolis & Guston, supra note 121, at 71.  
 132 See id. 
 133 Jon M. Peha, Science and Technology Advice for Congress: Past, Present, 
and Future, 24 RENEWABLE RESOURCES J. 19, 20-21 (2006). 
 134 Id. at 22 (noting that existing “organizations already have their own 
missions and their own cultures, which are not perfectly compatible with the 
technology assessment process”). 
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The Government Accountability Office (GAO), for example, has 
conducted a few technology assessment pilot projects at 
Congress’s direction.135 For the most part, these analyses have 
focused on narrow topics related to counterterrorism, such as 
the use of biometric technologies for border security and the 
use of cybersecurity measures to protect infrastructure.136 The 
credibility of the GAO’s work, moreover, is open to question, 
given the agency’s traditional expertise in performing audits, 
the past use of its reports for partisan political objectives, and 
its limited experience with predictive assessments.137 Another 
institution, the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), 
advises the president on science and technology issues. The 
OSTP has the authority to initiate studies, including 
technology assessments, to resolve critical and emerging 
problems.138 With its fairly limited resources, however, the 
OSTP has focused primarily on serving as a channel of 
communication between the president and the scientific 
community and on coordinating science and technology policy 
across the federal government.139 Lastly, the National Research 
Council (NRC) issues reports on science and technology topics 
in response to congressional and agency requests.140 These 
  
 135 GENEVIEVE J. KNEZO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21586, TECHNOLOGY 
ASSESSMENT IN CONGRESS: HISTORY AND LEGISLATIVE OPTIONS 4-6 (2005), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21586.pdf. 
 136 See id.; e.g., GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-321, TECHNOLOGY 
ASSESSMENT: CYBERSECURITY FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (2004), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04321.pdf; GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
GAO-03-174, TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT: USING BIOMETRICS FOR BORDER SECURITY 
(2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03174.pdf. 
 137 See Christopher T. Hill, An Expanded Analytical Capability in the 
Congressional Research Service, the General Accounting Office, or the Congressional Budget 
Office, in SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ADVICE FOR CONGRESS, supra note 103, at 106, 115-16; 
Hearing on 2011 Appropriations Before the Subcomm. on Legislative Branch Appropriations 
of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 111th Cong. 4 (2010) (written testimony of Francesca T. 
Grifo, Senior Scientist with the Union of Concerned Scientists), available at 
http://www.ucsusa.org/scientific_integrity/solutions/big_picture_solutions/restoring-the-
ota.html. 
 138 42 U.S.C. § 6614(a)(5) (2006). The OSTP’s statutory mission is to serve “as a 
source of scientific and technological analysis and judgment for the President with 
respect to major policies, plans, and programs of the Federal Government.” Id. § 6614(a). 
 139 DEBORAH D. STINE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34736, THE PRESIDENT’S 
OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY (OSTP): ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 5-7, 24-25 
(2009), available at http://ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/09Mar/RL34736.pdf. The OSTP 
receives external advice from the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology 
(PCAST), whose members are selected from industry, education, research, and other 
nongovernmental institutions. PCAST conducts workshops and convenes technical advisory 
groups that could carry out technology assessment functions. Id. at 9, 24-25. 
 140 See John Ahearne & Peter Blair, Expanded Use of the National Academies, 
in SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ADVICE FOR CONGRESS, supra note 103, at 118, 118-19, 
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authoritative reports are prepared by committees of leading 
experts through an extensive, peer-reviewed study process.141 
While well respected, these reports require significant time and 
resources to produce,142 and they are designed to generate 
expert recommendations in response to specific questions 
rather than to raise issues independently, address broader 
policy questions, or foster public debate.143 
B. NEPA as Technology Assessment 
Technology assessment can also take place in the 
context of environmental impact assessment. In particular, the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires federal 
agencies to assess the environmental impacts of their actions.144 
To the extent that such actions involve the development or 
implementation of technology, NEPA analysis could serve as a 
form of technology assessment with respect to health and 
environmental effects. The federal government’s extensive 
involvement or potential involvement in sponsoring research 
and development,145 establishing technology policies, and 
regulating technology’s adverse impacts underscores NEPA’s 
prospective reach. Nevertheless, narrow interpretations of 
NEPA by agencies and courts have minimized the statute’s 
value in technology assessment.  
  
123. The NRC is the operating arm of the National Academies, which include the 
National Academy of Sciences, a private, nonprofit organization established by 
congressional charter. Id. at 118. 
 141 Id. at 120; DEBORAH D. STINE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34454, SCIENCE 
AND TECHNOLOGY POLICYMAKING: A PRIMER 29 (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/ 
sgp/crs/misc/RL34454.pdf. 
 142 Ahearne & Blair, supra note 140, at 121; Rodemeyer, supra note 103, at 3-
4 (noting that the peer-review process ensures quality and balance, but takes time). 
 143 SCLOVE, supra note 1, at 19; Rodemeyer, supra note 103, at 4 (“[T]he 
Academies have only a limited independent capacity to raise questions that no political 
sponsor has an incentive to want answered.”). In addition, the National Academy of 
Sciences, and thus the NRC, is a private institution that can reject Congressional 
requests. Hearing on 2011 Amendments, supra note 137, at 4.  
 144 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006). 
 145 The 2009 federal budget, for instance, provided $1.5 billion to support 
nanotechnology research and development through thirteen federal agencies. EXEC. OFFICE 
OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL NANOTECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE, FY 2009 BUDGET AND 
HIGHLIGHTS (2008), available at http://www.nano.gov/NNI_FY09_budget_summary.pdf. 
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1. The Basics of NEPA 
Sometimes described as a “Magna Carta” for the 
environment,146 NEPA was enacted with the purpose of 
integrating environmental values into national policies and 
planning processes. The central requirement of NEPA is the 
environmental impact statement (EIS), a document that must 
be prepared for “major [f]ederal actions significantly affecting 
the quality of the human environment.”147 In the EIS, the 
government must describe the environmental impacts of the 
proposed action, including unavoidable adverse effects; 
alternatives to the proposed action; and any irreversible and 
irretrievable commitments of resources that the proposed 
action would involve.148 As the Supreme Court has recognized, 
the purpose of the EIS requirement is to  
ensure[] that the agency, in reaching its decision, will have 
available, and will carefully consider, detailed information 
concerning significant environmental impacts; it also guarantees 
that the relevant information will be made available to the larger 
audience that may also play a role in both the decisionmaking 
process and the implementation of that decision.149 
But NEPA was not meant merely to impose a 
requirement on agencies to document environmental impacts. 
Rather, NEPA was intended to achieve a wholesale 
reorientation of the government’s actions and values, 
sensitizing agencies to environmental values.150 Through 
programmatic EISs, for example, agencies could evaluate the 
environmental impacts of entire programs—not just individual 
  
 146 DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION § 1:1 (2d ed. 1992); see 
also 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a) (2010) (characterizing NEPA as “our basic national charter 
for protection of the environment”). 
 147 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). 
 148 Id. 
 149 Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989). 
For federal actions deemed to have less than significant impacts on the environment, 
agencies still must make a more limited inquiry known as an environmental 
assessment (EA), which identifies the environmental consequences of a proposed action 
and documents the agency’s determination that those consequences do not reach the 
statutory threshold of significance. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.4, 1508.9 (2010). 
 150 MATTHEW J. LINDSTROM & ZACHARY A. SMITH, THE NATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: JUDICIAL MISCONSTRUCTION, LEGISLATIVE INDIFFERENCE 
& EXECUTIVE NEGLECT 8 (2001). Senator Henry Jackson, NEPA’s main sponsor, touted 
NEPA as “the most important and far-reaching environmental and conservation measure 
ever enacted by the Congress.” 115 CONG. REC. 40,416 (1969). 
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projects—and reorient the programs in light of those impacts.151 
But whether NEPA created any enforceable substantive 
obligations, including any that might apply to new 
technologies, was not obvious on the face of the statute.152 
2. Implementing and Interpreting NEPA 
The implementation of NEPA by federal agencies and 
its interpretation by the courts have not fulfilled the promise 
embodied in the statute’s broad language and legislative 
history. NEPA’s primary mandate, the requirement that 
federal agencies prepare an EIS, has turned out to be less 
powerful than some of its crafters might have envisioned. First, 
that mandate applies only to “major federal actions”;153 it does 
not apply to private actions or to most legislation enacted by 
Congress.154 Moreover, the Supreme Court has construed the 
EIS requirement to impose only a procedural duty, rather than 
to mandate substantive results.155 This does not necessarily 
make the EIS requirement a toothless one; federal agencies, 
having analyzed the environmental ramifications of their 
decisions, may make decisions that are more environmentally 
sound than they would be otherwise. Nonetheless, agencies 
sometimes view the EIS as little more than a paper-pushing 
hurdle to be overcome before the agency can proceed with a 
predetermined course of action.156 
  
 151 40 C.F.R. § 1502.20 (2010) (encouraging practice of tiering analysis of site-
specific actions to broader EISs). 
 152 See, e.g., Denis Binder, NEPA, NIMBYs and New Technology, 25 LAND & 
WATER L. REV. 11 (1990) (arguing that “those seeking to obstruct the application of 
new technology and processes [through NEPA] will have to find a new legal tool to rely 
on” because agencies need only make requisite disclosures). At the time of NEPA’s 
enactment, many legislators viewed the statute as an uncontroversial way to burnish 
their environmental credentials, and the legislation received relatively little attention 
from lobbyists and interest groups. See RICHARD A. LIROFF, A NATIONAL POLICY FOR 
THE ENVIRONMENT: NEPA AND ITS AFTERMATH 10-11 (1976).  
 153 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). 
 154 Although the EIS requirement applies to agency “proposals for legislation,” 
id., the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations define legislation 
narrowly to include only legislative proposals “developed by or with the significant 
cooperation and support of a Federal agency” and to exclude requests for 
appropriations, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.17 (2010). 
 155 Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 353 (1989) 
(noting that NEPA relies “on procedural mechanisms—as opposed to substantive, 
result-based standards”); Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978) (“NEPA does set forth significant substantive goals for 
the Nation, but its mandate to the agencies is essentially procedural.”). 
 156 COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: 
A STUDY OF ITS EFFECTIVENESS AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS iii (1997) (“Some [agencies] 
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Supreme Court decisions have played a critical role in 
constraining the statute’s reach and effectiveness. First, in 
Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. v. Students Challenging Regulatory 
Agency Procedures (SCRAP), the Court rejected the argument 
that an EIS must be integrated into an agency’s decision-
making process from the outset.157 Rather, only when an agency 
“makes a recommendation or report on a proposal for federal 
action” must an EIS be prepared.158 Then, in Kleppe v. Sierra 
Club, the Court held that the mere contemplation of a project 
and preparation of a study do not trigger the obligation to 
prepare a programmatic EIS absent a proposal for federal 
action.159 Together, SCRAP and Kleppe allowed agencies to defer 
analyzing environmental impacts until after the overall policy-
making process is well underway.160 Although these decisions did 
not specifically involve new technologies, the negative 
implications for attempting to situate an effective technology 
assessment function within NEPA analyses are clear. 
The Court made its most direct pronouncements 
regarding the analyses of new technologies in Vermont Yankee 
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, 
Inc.161 In this challenge to licenses granted to specific nuclear 
facilities, the Court rejected the notion that NEPA provides a 
forum for the wholesale consideration of the desirability of new 
technologies: 
Nuclear energy may some day be a cheap, safe source of power or it 
may not. But Congress has made a choice to at least try nuclear 
energy, establishing a reasonable review process in which courts are 
  
act as if the [EIS] . . . is an end in itself, rather than a tool to enhance and improve 
decision-making.”); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and 
Managing Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 922-23 
(2002) (contending that NEPA documentation is often “overstuff[ed] . . . with 
information from every available source, regardless of its quality,” but that little 
evidence suggests that the information discussed in such documentation actually 
influences agency decisionmaking). 
 157 Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency 
Procedures (SCRAP), 422 U.S. 289, 320-22 (1975). 
 158 Id. at 320. 
 159 Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 406 (1976). 
 160 As various critics have pointed out, the preparation of environmental 
documentation in practice often remains separated from much of the decision-making 
process. Daniel A. Farber, Adaptation Planning and Climate Impact Assessments: 
Learning from NEPA’s Flaws, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,605, 10,609 (2009) (“[T]he EIS 
process has been isolated from agencies’ primary decision processes.”); Oliver A. Houck, 
How’d We Get Divorced?: The Curious Case of NEPA and Planning, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 
10,645, 10,648-49 (2009). 
 161 Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 
U.S. 519 (1978). 
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to play only a limited role. The fundamental policy questions 
appropriately resolved in Congress and in the state legislatures are 
not subject to reexamination in the federal courts . . . . NEPA does 
set forth significant substantive goals for the Nation, but its 
mandate to the agencies is essentially procedural.162 
In Vermont Yankee, the Court correctly recognized that NEPA’s 
obligations do not apply to legislative decisions, and that 
democratic institutions—Congress and state legislatures—
should resolve fundamental policy questions. Nonetheless, the 
Court failed to appreciate NEPA’s potential to inform those 
decisions and to guide agencies in the exercise of policy-making 
authority delegated to them. Rather, the Court continued to 
steer agencies towards a narrow, technocratic approach to 
NEPA analysis that has prevailed ever since. The Court’s 
opinions have not ended the preparation of programmatic 
EISs—the sort of overarching analyses that could serve as a 
useful instrument of technology assessment—but many 
agencies try to defer programmatic assessments as long as 
possible if not all together.163 Ultimately, NEPA has not lived up 
to its potential to serve as a tool for analyzing the environmental 
risks and uncertainties of major policy developments, including 
the development of new technologies. In the words of Oliver 
Houck: “NEPA is missing the point. It is producing lots of little 
statements on highway segments, timber sales, and other 
foregone conclusions; it isn’t even present, much less effective, 
when the major decisions . . . are made.”164 
C. Nonregulatory Mechanisms 
Technology assessments can be carried out not only by 
government agencies, but also by those directly engaged in 
technology development. Researchers, for example, may look to 
personal morals and professional ethics to guide, shape, and 
constrain their research pursuits. The predominant model of 
technology development, however, is for scientists and 
engineers to conceive of technology instrumentally; that is, as 
value free and neutral, not based on morals.165 This model does 
  
 162 Id. at 557-58. 
 163 Jon C. Cooper, Broad Programmatic, Policy and Planning Assessments 
Under the National Environmental Policy Act and Similar Devices: A Quiet Revolution in 
an Approach to Environmental Considerations, 11 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 89, 117-18 (1993). 
 164 Houck, supra note 160, at 10,648. 
 165 See Erik Fisher & Clark A. Miller, Collaborative Practices for Contextualizing 
the Engineering Laboratory, in ENGINEERING IN CONTEXT 369, 376 (S.H. Christensen et 
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not encourage researchers to consider their work in a broader 
context or in an ethically critical way.166 Furthermore, 
researchers—including those in academic institutions—face 
strong economic incentives to tailor their efforts in favor of 
technologies with marketing potential.167 
Firms may have a stronger incentive to carry out health 
and safety assessments with respect to the technologies they 
develop and market, given their greater potential for legal 
liability or reputational damage. Indeed, corporations can and 
often do go beyond what the law explicitly requires.168 With 
respect to new technologies, corporations might, for example, 
assess potential social and environmental consequences with 
an unusual degree of care, reach out to the public to try to 
identify and address externalities, or choose not to develop 
hazardous applications despite their potential for profit.169 Such 
actions need not be altruistic; they can translate into lower 
costs, reduced risk exposure, the avoidance of onerous 
regulation, and an ability to command higher product 
premiums.170 In addition, companies may lose their social 
  
al. eds., 2009); Byron Newberry, Are Engineers Instrumentalists?, 29 TECH. SOC’Y 107, 
109, 112-13 (2007); see also J. Britt Holbrook, Assessing the Science-Society Relation: The 
Case of the US National Science Foundation’s Second Merit Review Criterion, 27 TECH. 
SOC’Y 437, 438 (2005) (describing institutionalization of Vannevar Bush’s views regarding 
the degree of autonomy necessary for basic scientific research). 
 166 See Fisher & Miller, supra note 165, at 376. 
 167 See JASANOFF, supra note 91, at 235-36 (describing the effect of industrial 
funding of university research and of the Bayh-Dole Act, which allowed recipients of 
federal grants to patent discoveries funded by federal money). 
 168 The concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR), broadly defined, refers 
to socially beneficial decisions and actions by firms that go beyond the legal minimum. 
Paul R. Portney, Corporate Social Responsibility: An Economic and Public Policy 
Perspective, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF 
FIRMS 107, 108 (Bruce L. Hay et al. eds., 2005). A narrower definition of CSR focuses 
on profit-sacrificing behavior by businesses acting under moral or social obligations. 
Summary of Discussion on Corporate Social Responsibility and Economics, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRMS, supra, at 
145, 146. Whether such activity—which is arguably contrary to the very purpose of 
private corporations and to the interest of shareholders—exists at a meaningful level is 
a matter of debate. Id. at 146 (noting that a number of discussion participants “were 
quick to point out that profit-sacrificing behavior is exceedingly difficult to observe”). 
 169 Daniel C. Esty, On Portney’s Complaint: Reconceptualizing Corporate 
Social Responsibility, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND THE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRMS, supra note 168, at 137, 141-42 (suggesting ways in which 
CSR could be reconceptualized). 
 170 Forest L. Reinhardt, Environmental Protection and the Social 
Responsibility of Firms: Perspectives from the Business Literature, in ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION AND THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRMS, supra note 168, at 151, 159-68. 
In addition, banks and insurance companies often have an interest in overseeing the 
risk exposure of their clients. See DANIEL C. ESTY & ANDREW S. WINSTON, GREEN TO 
GOLD: HOW SMART COMPANIES USE ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGY TO INNOVATE, CREATE 
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license to operate should they fail to live up to social 
expectations about environmental behavior.171 Whatever their 
motivation may be, however, it is unlikely that firms’ efforts 
along these lines will lead to adequate technology assessment. 
Firms are profit-seeking entities whose ultimate obligations 
are to their shareholders.172 Often, the analyses that firms 
undertake are internal assessments that focus on marketing 
potential and do little to inform policymakers or to involve the 
public in fundamental decisions about technology.173 
III. REVITALIZING TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 
As a society, we are not doing enough to assess the 
health and environmental effects of emerging technologies or to 
involve the public and incorporate its values into decisions 
about technology. This Part considers options for addressing 
these inadequacies: reconstituting the OTA or reinvigorating 
NEPA practice would be relatively simple ways to increase our 
understanding of new technologies, but achieving substantive 
change and meaningful participation will require more radical 
reforms. 
A. Resurrecting Old Tools 
1. Reconstituting the OTA 
Reestablishing the Office of Technology Assessment would 
be a modest first step towards building societal capacity to make 
  
VALUE, AND BUILD COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 11, 94-95 (2006). The re-insurance 
company Swiss Re, for instance, has been active in drawing attention to potential risks 
of nanoparticles. See Arie Rip, Nanoscience and Nanotechnologies: Bridging Gaps 
Through Constructive Technology Assessment, in HANDBOOK OF TRANSDISCIPLINARY 
RESEARCH 145, 152 (G. Hirsch Hadorn et al. eds., 2008). If the uncertainties associated 
with the adverse consequences of a technology are too great, however, insurers may 
exert little constraint on the behavior of firms. 
 171 See ESTY & WINSTON, supra note 170, at 12. 
 172 Portney, supra note 168, at 126 (contending that almost all examples of 
CSR are profit-motivated); see also Summary of Discussion, supra note 168, at 146 
(recounting the view that avoiding tort liability and influencing future regulation 
explain beyond-compliance behavior). 
 173 David J. Vogel, Opportunities for and Limitations of Corporate 
Environmentalism, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
OF FIRMS, supra note 168, at 197, 199 (contending that as an empirical matter, self-
regulation is inadequate to address adverse effects and arguing that government 
regulation is responsible for almost all improvements in environmental quality). 
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informed and accountable decisions about new technologies.174 
Such a move would address Congress’s ongoing need for informed 
and objective advice on scientific and technical matters.175 Indeed, 
since the OTA’s elimination, several proposals have been made 
either to create a new technology assessment office or to authorize 
funding to reestablish the OTA.176 None of these proposals has 
gained much traction, however.177 Few current members of 
Congress have had any experience with the OTA,178 and a truly 
independent technology assessment office might raise broad, long-
range concerns that are not politically expedient to address.179 In 
addition, while the reestablishment of the OTA could contribute 
to better informed policymaking, an OTA patterned after its 
predecessor would not generate new information on the hazards 
of emerging technologies, nor bring about broad and meaningful 
public engagement. Revitalized technology assessment should 
involve not only an OTA-like institution, but also other measures 
that can bring about dynamic and participatory technology 
management, as Part III.B will explain. 
2. Recapturing NEPA’s Lost Potential 
Another modest step towards improving societal 
decision making on technology would involve more robust 
implementation of NEPA. As discussed above, current 
implementation of NEPA entails little wholesale consideration 
of technological developments and their ramifications for 
society and the environment.180 Overall, NEPA practice is a pale 
shadow of the possibilities embodied in the statute.181 The 
implementation of NEPA can better reflect the technological 
concerns that motivated its enactment. Changes in 
  
 174 See Daryl E. Chubin, Filling the Policy Vacuum Created by OTA’s Demise, 
ISSUES SCI. & TECH., Winter 2000-2001, at 31; Gerald L. Epstein & Ashton B. Carter, A 
Dedicated Organization in Congress, in SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ADVICE FOR 
CONGRESS, supra note 103, at 157. 
 175 See Rodemeyer, supra note 103, at 3. 
 176 KNEZO, supra note 135, at 2-4. 
 177 See id. at 4; SCLOVE, supra note 1, at 18. 
 178 Rodemeyer, supra note 103, at 4. 
 179 Id. at 4-5. 
 180 See supra Part II.B.2. 
 181 This view is shared by numerous critics. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 160, 
at 10,605 (identifying “shortcomings of current environmental assessment 
procedures”); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Whither NEPA?, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 333 
(2004) (discussing potential NEPA reforms); Daniel R. Mandelker, Thoughts on NEPA 
at 40, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,640 (2009) (arguing for greater application of NEPA 
analyses to agency programs and not just individual projects). 
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implementation would provide only a partial response to 
emerging technologies, however, since NEPA’s scope is confined 
to those developments that involve federal agency action. 
a. NEPA’s Concern with Technology 
NEPA requires agencies to adopt a long-term 
orientation that considers environmental consequences for 
present as well as future generations.182 Thus, EISs must 
discuss “the relationship between local short-term uses of 
man’s environment and the maintenance and enhancement of 
long-term productivity,” as well as “any irreversible and 
irretrievable commitments of resources.”183 Moreover, the 
statute explicitly recognizes “the profound influences of . . . new 
and expanding technological advances” on the environment and 
declares a purpose of “promot[ing] efforts which will prevent or 
eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere.”184 The 
statute’s objective of transforming the relationship between 
human activity, productivity, and long-term effects on the 
environment necessarily requires new ways of analyzing and 
managing modern technologies. 
NEPA’s legislative history singles out the dangers posed 
by technology even more explicitly. In floor debates and 
committee hearings, various congressmen expressed their 
individual concerns about the damage done by technology to 
the environment.185 Quoting an editorial that appeared in the 
New York Times, the House committee responsible for 
considering NEPA legislation singled out technology as the 
greatest threat to the environment:  
  
 182 JAMES MCELFISH & ELISSA PARKER, REDISCOVERING THE NATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: BACK TO THE FUTURE 12-15 (1995). 
 183 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006). 
 184 Id. §§ 4321, 4331(a). 
 185 On the House side, see, for example, 115 CONG. REC. 26,569, 26,577 (1969) 
(statement of Rep. Farbstein) (“For too long, we have stressed technological progress, 
assuming that our environment could take care of itself.”); id. at 26,583 (statement of 
Rep. Donohue) (“Every school child and adult in this country is well aware that the 
advance of modern technology, however great its material benefits, has been 
unrestrained in its accompanying afflictions upon us through byproducts that 
increasingly poison our air and pollute our waters.”); id. (statement of Rep. Cohelan) 
(“We are fast becoming a victim of our own technology and progress.”). On the Senate 
side, see, for example, 115 CONG. REG. 40,415, 40,417 (1969) (statement of Sen. 
Jackson) (“While the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 is not a panacea, it is 
a starting point. A great deal more, however, remains to be done . . . if mankind and 
human dignity are not to be ground down in the years ahead by the expansive and 
impersonal technology modern science has created.”). 
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By land, sea, and air, the enemies of man’s survival relentlessly 
press their attack. The most dangerous of all these enemies is man’s 
own undirected technology. The radioactive poisons from nuclear 
tests, the runoff into rivers of nitrogen fertilizers, the smog from 
automobiles, the pesticides in the food chains, and the destruction of 
topsoil by strip mining are examples of the failure to foresee and 
control the untoward consequences of modern technology.186 
The counterpart committee in the Senate likewise recognized 
the dangers posed by “[a] growing technological power which is 
far outstripping man’s capacity to understand and ability to 
control its impact on the environment.”187 Indeed, an influential 
report prepared for that committee singled out technology as 
the root cause of the perceived environmental crisis: 
Technology . . . has greatly increased environmental stress in 
general. The net result has been enormously increased demands 
upon the environment in addition to the increase in 
population. . . . Unfortunately, our productive technology has been 
accompanied by side effects which we did not forsee [sic]. . . . It is 
now becoming apparent that we cannot continue to enjoy the 
benefits of our productive economy unless we bring its harmful side 
effects under control.188 
That report called for a “pay-as-you-go” approach to the 
development and use of technology, under which the cost of 
environmental harms would be internalized, with 
“provision . . . made for the protection, restoration, 
replacement, or rehabilitation of elements in the environment 
before, or at the time, these resources are used.”189 
b. The EIS as Technology Assessment 
The effects of emerging technologies were undoubtedly 
an important motivation behind NEPA’s enactment, and the 
EIS was to be a central tool for identifying and better 
managing these effects.190 Indeed, early judicial interpretations 
  
 186 H.R. REP. NO. 91-378, at 3 (1969). 
 187 S. REP. NO. 91-296, at 6 (1969); see also id. at 8 (identifying population 
growth and “advancing technological developments which have enlarged man’s capacity 
to effectuate environmental change” as primary causes for environmental concern). 
 188 115 CONG. REC. 29,069 (1969) (reprinting A National Policy for the 
Environment: A Report on the Need for a National Policy for the Environment, Special 
Report to the S. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 90th Cong. (1968)). 
 189 Id. at 29,070. 
 190 See LYNTON KEITH CALDWELL, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
ACT: AN AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE xvi (1998) (“[T]he procedural requirements of NEPA 
are intended to force attention to the policies declared in the Statement of 
Purpose . . . and in Title I (Section 101) of the Act.”). 
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of NEPA recognized the potential for EISs to enable a proactive 
and comprehensive approach to new technologies. The opinion 
of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit in Scientists’ Institute for Public Information, 
Inc. v. Atomic Energy Commission (SIPI),191 issued three years 
after NEPA’s enactment, exemplifies this approach. In SIPI, 
the plaintiffs alleged that the Atomic Energy Commission 
(AEC) was required to prepare an EIS for its breeder reactor 
program, which was in the research and development stage. 
The AEC conceded that an EIS would be required before the 
construction of individual breeder reactors and facilities, but 
argued that no NEPA analysis was required for the research 
and development program as a whole. 
Recognizing “NEPA’s objective of controlling the impact 
of technology on the environment,” the court rejected the AEC’s 
arguments.192 The court explained that environmental analysis 
of the research and development program was necessary 
because the program would facilitate subsequent use of breeder 
reactor technology by private parties that in turn would affect 
the environment.193 In the words of the court: “[T]he decisions 
our society makes today as to the direction of research and 
development will determine what technologies are available 10, 
20, or 30 years hence . . . .”194 As the court further noted, 
consideration of a technology’s environmental impacts would be 
far more meaningful at the research and development stage 
than at the point when specific facilities are being 
constructed.195 Once a specific project is in mind, substantial 
resources have already been committed in developing the 
technology, and vested interests in that technology—perhaps 
including the regulatory agency itself—will undermine the 
objectivity of the decision-making process.196 Only a 
programmatic EIS at the research and development stage, in 
the court’s view, would fulfill NEPA’s purpose of informing 
Congress, the executive branch, and the public of the 
  
 191 Scientists’ Inst. for Pub. Info., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm’n (SIPI), 481 
F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 192 Id. at 1089. 
 193 Id. at 1088-89. 
 194 Id. at 1090. 
 195 Id. at 1089-90. 
 196 Id. at 1089-90 & n.43. 
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environmental effects of new technologies in such a way as to 
ensure informed decision making.197 
The D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of the EIS obligation in 
SIPI is consistent with NEPA’s text as well as its implementing 
regulations, and it hews closely to Congress’s purpose in 
enacting NEPA. As noted earlier, an EIS must be prepared for 
“major [f]ederal actions significantly affecting the quality of the 
human environment.”198 NEPA does not define major federal 
actions, but federal decisions and policies regarding new 
technologies often do have a significant effect on environmental 
quality. Moreover, NEPA’s regulations provide that major 
federal action, “include[s] new and continuing activities, 
including projects and programs entirely or partly financed, 
assisted, conducted, regulated, or approved by federal 
agencies.”199 The regulations also indicate that agencies may 
conduct their evaluations “[b]y stage of technological 
development including federal or federally assisted research, 
development or demonstration programs for new technologies 
which, if applied, could significantly affect the quality of the 
human environment.”200 
In light of these regulations and the SIPI analysis, 
federal research funding decisions should be treated as major 
federal actions subject to NEPA. The nature of the 
environmental analysis and level of detail will depend on the 
stage of technological research and development. Where the 
funding is for basic research in a new field, discussion of possible 
environmental effects may necessarily be general and couched in 
uncertainty. Where research involves technology nearing 
commercialization or deployment, however, a more thorough and 
specific environmental analysis should be prepared.201 The EIS, 
  
 197 Id. at 1089-90. 
 198 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006). 
 199 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(a) (2010). One category of major federal actions 
identified in the regulation includes “[a]doption of programs, such as a group of 
concerted actions to implement a specific policy or plan.” Id. § 1508.18(b)(3). 
 200 Id. § 1502.4. 
 201 Cf. SIPI, 481 F.2d at 1094 (discussing factors to be considered by an agency 
in deciding when to draft an EIS for a technology development program, including 
likelihood that technology will prove commercially feasible, and availability of 
meaningful information on effects of technology and alternatives). Post-SIPI decisions 
have declined to mandate preparation of programmatic impact statements for 
unrelated research projects, but environmental analyses of individual projects continue 
to be required. See, e.g., Found. on Econ. Trends v. Lyng, 817 F.2d 882, 884-85 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987) (no programmatic EIS required for “diverse and discrete” animal 
productivity research projects); Found. on Econ. Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143 (D.C. 
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in sum, is a well-suited vehicle for agencies to study and 
consider an emerging technology’s potential consequences—
environmental or otherwise—during developmental stages and 
before a technology has become entrenched. 
c. Other NEPA Tools for Technology Assessment 
NEPA also contains other mechanisms that could be 
used to better manage new technologies. Section 101 of the 
statute expresses Congress’s concern about the environmental 
impacts of new technologies and suggests the dawning of a 
more thoughtful approach to the relationship between 
technology and the environment: 
The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man’s activity on 
the interrelations of all components of the natural environment, 
particularly the profound influences of . . . new and expanding 
technological advances . . . , declares that it is the continuing policy 
of the Federal Government . . . to use all practicable means and 
measures . . . to create and maintain conditions under which man 
and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, 
economic, and other requirements of present and future generations 
of Americans.202 
Section 101 is a policy statement that the Supreme Court has 
held to be judicially unenforceable.203 Nonetheless, the provision 
represents a broad, government-wide commitment to address 
the potential dangers of new technologies204 and thereby to foster 
“conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive 
harmony.” Section 101, in other words, provides federal agencies 
with direction and authority to make discretionary choices—
  
Cir. 1985) (vacating lower court injunction of GMO deliberate release experiments in 
absence of programmatic EIS). 
 202 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 203 Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 
(1980) (stressing that NEPA does establish substantive goals, but imposes only 
procedural duties). Compare Holly Doremus, Constitutive Law and Environmental 
Policy, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 295, 355 (2003) (“Section 101 of NEPA declares a national 
policy for the environment in a provision with no direct regulatory force.”), and Michael 
C. Blumm, The National Environmental Policy Act at Twenty, 20 ENVTL. L. 447, 450 
(1990) (noting Supreme Court decisions “ignoring the high-minded aspirations 
contained in section 101 and apparently considering NEPA to require just the 
paperwork and public disclosure specified in section 102”), with Nicholas C. Yost, 
NEPA’s Promise—Partially Fulfilled, 20 ENVTL. L. 533, 548 (1990) (“[S]ection 
102(1) . . . explicitly requires all agencies to follow the policies of section 101. That is a 
substantive requirement, and it is appropriately judicially enforceable.”). 
 204 CALDWELL, supra note 190, at xvi (“NEPA, as policy, is a ‘template’ against 
which decisions affecting the environment can be compared for consistency with its 
declared principles.”). 
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whether in determining technology priorities, funding research 
and development, or investigating potential technology 
hazards—in ways that reduce environmental damage, mitigate 
harmful effects, and maximize public input.205 
NEPA also established an institutional mechanism to 
study and address the environmental ramifications of new 
technologies: the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ). 
The CEQ’s functions were to include the gathering of 
information concerning conditions and trends in environmental 
quality—including the environmental impacts of new 
technologies.206 Congressional debate on the provisions to 
establish the CEQ repeatedly emphasized the authority of the 
CEQ to conduct research and provide policy advice regarding 
the long-overlooked environmental consequences of new 
technologies.207 And shortly after NEPA’s enactment, President 
Nixon issued an executive order directing the CEQ to “[f]oster 
investigations, studies, surveys, research, and analyses 
relating to (i) ecological systems and environmental quality, (ii) 
the impact of new and changing technologies thereon, and (iii) 
means of preventing or reducing adverse effects from such 
technologies.”208 Just as the Council of Economic Advisers 
provides economic advice to the president, the CEQ would 
oversee the execution of NEPA’s declared policy of protecting 
  
 205 See Philip Michael Ferester, Revitalizing the National Environmental 
Policy Act: Substantive Law Adaptations from NEPA’s Progeny, 16 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 207, 211-17 (1992) (discussing potential substantive mandates under NEPA). 
 206 42 U.S.C. § 4344 (2006); see also National Environmental Policy: Hearing 
on S. 1075, S. 237, and S. 1752 Before the S. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 
91st Cong. (1969) (statement of Sen. Jackson upon introducing NEPA legislation), 
available at 1970 NEPA Leg. Hist. 30 (LEXIS) (“The Council would . . . help the 
President evaluate the trends of new technologies and developments as they affect our 
total surroundings, and to develop broad policies, including those related to 
anticipatory research, to prevent future man-induced environmental changes which 
could have serious social and economic consequences.”). 
 207 See, e.g., 115 CONG. REC. 26,569, 26,575 (1969) (statement of Rep. 
Schadeberg) (“If such a council existed at the time of the invention of the automobile, 
perhaps we would have been able to realize the threat that would be presented to our 
atmosphere by the internal combustion of hydrocarbons before it was too late.”); id. at 
26,583-84 (statement of Rep. Cohelan) (“The proposed five-man Council would provide a 
broad and independent overview of . . . environmental problems that have been created 
by advancing technology.”); id. at 26,585 (statement of Rep. Boland) (“[T]here is a growing 
body of evidence that society is paying a high price in environmental pollution for the 
advantages that flow from the rapid spread of technology. . . . [CEQ will] provide a vitally 
needed source for reviewing the total environmental situation—an ‘early warning’ system 
that warns us of the effect on the environment of a particular program.”). 
 208 Exec. Order No. 11,514 § 3(k), 35 Fed. Reg. 4247, 4248 (Mar. 7, 1970).  
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the environment and provide advice as to what actions should 
be taken to further that policy.209 
The role of the CEQ, however, has turned out to be far 
more circumscribed than originally envisioned. The CEQ has 
issued regulations and guidance documents that have played a 
significant role in the implementation of the EIS requirement.210 
But the CEQ’s broader mission of anticipating environmental 
problems and providing policy advice has been largely 
neglected.211 The CEQ has been poorly funded and since 1980 
has operated through a single member rather than through a 
full council of three.212 The CEQ nonetheless retains its 
statutory authority to analyze environmental trends, to study 
the environmental impacts of new technologies, and to play a 
greater role in policymaking. With robust support from 
Congress and the president—support that it has not received to 
date—the CEQ could exercise that authority to play a key role 
in technology assessment.213 In particular, the CEQ’s most 
valuable function could be to take the lead in identifying 
emerging technologies and potential hazards that might be 
associated with them, thereby laying the groundwork for more 
detailed assessment, policy initiatives, or legislative action.214 
  
 209 See CALDWELL, supra note 190, at 38-42; see also 42 U.S.C. § 4344 (2006) 
(describing CEQ’s duties and functions). 
 210 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1-1508.28 (2010); Forty Most Asked Questions 
Concerning CEQ’s National Environmental Policy Act Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,026 
(1981). Recently, the CEQ has turned its attention to how agencies should incorporate 
climate change analyses into environmental review documents. Memorandum from 
Nancy H. Sutley, Chair of the Council on Envtl. Quality, on Draft NEPA Guidance on 
Consideration of the Effects of Climate Change and Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Feb. 
18, 2010), available at http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/regs/Consideration_of_Effects_of_ 
GHG_Draft_NEPA_Guidance_FINAL_02182010.pdf; see also Bradley C. Karkkainen, 
Framing Rules: Breaking the Information Bottleneck, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 75, 79-81 
(2008); Madeline June Kass, A NEPA Climate Paradox: Taking Greenhouse Gases into 
Account in Threshold Significance Determinations, 42 IND. L. REV. 47, 48-49, 52-55 
(2009); Amy L. Stein, Climate Change Under NEPA: Avoiding Cursory Consideration of 
Greenhouse Gases, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 473, 475-76 (2010). 
 211 See CALDWELL, supra note 190, at 39-42; see also Scott C. Whitney, The 
Role of the President’s Council on Environmental Quality in the 1990’s and Beyond, 6 J. 
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 81, 104 (1991) (recommending that CEQ devote its energy to serving 
as an expert advisory body). 
 212 CALDWELL, supra note 190, at 39-42; LINDSTROM & SMITH, supra note 150, 
at 130-31; Michael E. Kraft & Norman J. Vig, Environmental Policy from the 1970s to 
the 1990s: Continuity and Change, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1990S 3, 19 
(Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds., 2d ed. 1994). Indeed, several proposals have 
been made for the CEQ’s elimination. LINDSTROM & SMITH, supra note 150, at 130-31. 
 213 See CALDWELL, supra note 190, at 156-57. 
 214 Cf. Jonathan Zasloff, Choose the Best Answer: Organizing Climate Change 
Negotiation in the Obama Administration, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 330, 335-36 
(2009) (“Presidents have used the CEQ as a vehicle for administering their pet projects.”). 
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B. Technology Assessment 2.0 
A reconstituted OTA and revitalized NEPA process 
would improve our understanding of emerging technologies and 
our policies towards them. But genuine transformation of our 
relationship with such technologies requires redesigned 
technology assessment and additional mechanisms to 
incorporate careful analysis and public participation.  
In conventional technology assessment (conventional 
TA), the OTA considered the potential impacts of a relatively 
finished technology and submitted the results in reports to 
Congress. This form of technology assessment was quite 
limited: its purposes were relatively circumscribed, its intended 
audience was narrow, and its impacts were uncertain. Rather 
than attempting to involve the public or to comprehensively 
project the consequences of new technological developments, 
the OTA took on the more manageable task of summarizing the 
existing state of knowledge on narrowly focused issues.215 And 
as noted above, the term technology assessment was commonly 
understood to refer to the OTA’s written reports, rather than 
the entire assessment process.216 
An important factor in the relative ineffectiveness of 
conventional TA is the longstanding separation of the 
promotion of technology from its control and regulation.217 
Conventional TA, in other words, had little effect on the 
technology development process itself and exercised whatever 
modest influence it had by contributing towards regulation as 
an “after-the-fact gatekeeper.”218 Furthermore, conventional TA 
tended to treat technology decisions as single-shot decisions 
rather than as ongoing processes.219 The process of analyzing a 
technology, however, is an integral aspect of technology 
management.220 Depending on who participates in TA and how 
TA is carried out, these processes themselves can have a 
critical influence on the shapes and uses of a technology. The 
separation of technical analysis—conducted by the OTA—from 
  
 215 Sarewitz, supra note 127, at 3; see also supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the 
fairly constricted practice of technology assessment at the OTA). 
 216 See supra text accompanying note 128. 
 217 See Arie Rip et al., Constructive Technology Assessment: A New Paradigm for 
Managing Technology in Society, in MANAGING TECHNOLOGY IN SOCIETY: THE APPROACH 
OF CONSTRUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 1, 2 (Arie Rip et al. eds., 1995). 
 218 Id.  
 219 See id. at 7-8. 
 220 See WESTRUM, supra note 79, at 325. 
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the decision-making process in Congress meant that there was 
little assurance that the OTA’s analysis would make a 
difference.221 And because the conventional TA process was 
limited largely to experts, it was relatively distant from 
democratic control and unresponsive to public values. 
In an effort to address the deficiencies of conventional 
TA, various countries have experimented with modified forms 
of TA, including participatory technology assessment (PTA) 
and constructive technology assessment (CTA). These more 
recent forms of TA represent important advances, but would 
benefit from further reforms to improve the analysis of 
emerging technologies and better incorporate public values. 
1. Participatory Technology Assessment 
Like conventional TA, PTA considers technology options 
that have already been developed. Unlike conventional TA, 
however, PTA actively seeks to incorporate outside viewpoints 
and public values into the assessment process by involving a 
wider range of actors.222 Participants in PTA include lay 
members of the public, as well as stakeholders and experts.223 In 
widening the scope of participation, PTA may perform 
functions such as educating the public, stimulating public 
debate, setting the political agenda, breaking a political 
stalemate, and informing decisionmakers of public opinions 
and values.224 PTA does not, however, replace or eliminate the 
expert assessment function of conventional TA. Rather, PTA 
complements this function by providing more information on 
the social acceptability of a technology and by bolstering the 
credibility of expert assessments.225 PTA’s strength, in other 
words, lies in its ability to introduce public values into 
decisions concerning technology. 
PTA taps into both participatory and representative 
conceptions of democracy. Citizens who take part in PTA engage 
directly and extensively with critical issues, and their views and 
  
 221 See Sarewitz, supra note 127, at 4 (“[C]onventional TA embodies a sort of 
hyper-rational approach to decision making whose greatest error lies not in its unrealistic 
expectation of accurate predictions, but in its linear view of how decisions should be made.”). 
 222 See KLÜVER ET AL., supra note 114, at 9, 23-24; SCLOVE, supra note 1, at 24-25. 
 223 See KLÜVER ET AL., supra note 114, at 9. 
 224 See id. at 130, 137-39. 
 225 See id. at 170. 
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conclusions may be presented to decisionmakers.226 Participants 
are not accountable to constituents nor do they formally 
represent particular interests, but they are expected to reflect 
varying viewpoints.227 PTA differs from the more familiar 
participatory format of town hall meetings in this 
representational aspect, as well as in the depth of citizen 
involvement.228 Unlike polls or focus groups, which are 
comparatively superficial means of gauging public opinion, PTA 
strives to elicit citizens’ views in a policy-making context after 
citizens have had an opportunity to learn about and reflect upon 
an issue.229 And because panel membership is drawn from a pool 
of randomly selected individuals, PTA is less subject to political 
capture or grandstanding than are advisory commissions.230 
PTA techniques for assessing new technologies include 
consensus conferences, citizens’ juries, and planning cells. All 
of these techniques organize lay persons into panels that 
consult over several days and consider the input of experts and 
others.231 In a consensus conference, for example, a multiday 
public meeting is convened to foster a dialogue between a panel 
of fifteen to twenty-five citizens and a group of experts.232 
Citizens invited to serve on the panel are drawn from a random 
sample of the population and then selected through an 
  
 226 See Ida-Elisabeth Andersen & Birgit Jæger, Scenario Workshops and 
Consensus Conferences: Towards More Democratic Decision-Making, 26 SCI. & PUB. 
POL’Y 331, 334 (1999). 
 227 See id. 
 228 Cf. ANNA COOTE & JO LENAGHAN, CITIZENS’ JURIES: THEORY INTO 
PRACTICE 7 (1997) (noting potential for public meetings to be dominated by self-
selected, seasoned activists or narrow interests who simply rehearse fixed positions). 
 229 Ned Crosby, Citizens’ Juries: One Solution for Difficult Environmental 
Questions, in FAIRNESS AND COMPETENCE IN CITIZEN PARTICIPATION: EVALUATING 
MODELS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DISCOURSE 157, 173 (Ortwin Renn et al. eds., 1995); 
Georg Hörning, Citizens’ Panels as a Form of Deliberative Technology Assessment, 26 
SCI. & PUB. POL’Y 351, 358 (1999); see also Daniel J. Fiorino, Citizen Participation and 
Environmental Risk: A Survey of Institutional Mechanisms, 15 SCI., TECH. & HUMAN 
VALUES 226, 234 (1990) (noting that surveys “isolate problems and issues from their 
social and community context”); COOTE & LENAGHAN, supra note 228, at 6 (describing 
polls as “superficial and non-interactive, designed to elicit the uninformed views of the 
public”); Fischhoff, supra note 110, at 79 (“Polls might obtain snapshots of current 
beliefs; however, those beliefs should have little value for policymakers who are 
contemplating long-term policies or anticipating the outcome of an intensive public 
debate.”). For a critical view of citizens’ juries, see Audrey Armour, The Citizens’ Jury 
Model of Public Participation: A Critical Evaluation, in FAIRNESS AND COMPETENCE IN 
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION, supra, at 175, 181. 
 230 SCLOVE, supra note 1, at 34. 
 231 See Hörning, supra note 229, at 351. 
 232 Andersen & Jæger, supra note 226, at 331; Hörning, supra note 229, at 352. 
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application process.233 Applicants submit a statement 
explaining their interest in participation, and these statements 
are used to identify persons sufficiently dedicated to 
participate.234 Assisted throughout the process by a facilitator 
trained in communication skills and cooperative techniques, 
the panel conducts two preparatory meetings prior to the 
consensus conference.235 At these meetings, panel members 
learn basic information about the technology at issue and 
formulate questions to be addressed at the conference.236 At the 
conference itself, experts (selected in part by the citizen panel) 
present their answers to the panel’s questions; citizens may 
then cross-examine the experts.237 In some instances, interest 
group representatives and members of the audience may 
participate in the discussion as well.238 After the discussion 
period, the citizen panel prepares a consensus-based report 
presenting its conclusions and recommendations.239 The report 
has no binding effect, but is available to the public, experts, 
and politicians for their consideration.240 
Other PTA techniques may differ in the details of 
implementation, but the underlying purposes are the same: to 
involve the public and incorporate public input more effectively 
into decisions regarding technology.241 Citizens’ juries, for 
example, generate lay findings and recommendations on 
focused policy questions in a process akin to a jury trial, often 
in a local or regional context.242 Planning cells also involve 
randomly selected citizens in a trial-like process, but 
participants have more freedom than citizens’ juries to design 
policy options and to consider a range of concerns.243 
  
 233 Andersen & Jæger, supra note 226, at 335-36; FRANK FISCHER, CITIZENS, 
EXPERTS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 235 (2000) (suggesting that use of sociodemographic 
criteria to select participants results in panels that are “generally a reasonable cross 
section of ordinary citizens with no special interest or knowledge”). 
 234 See FISCHER, supra note 233, at 235. 
 235 See id. at 235-36. 
 236 Andersen & Jæger, supra note 226, at 331. 
 237 See id.  
 238 Id.; FISCHER, supra note 233, at 236-37. 
 239 Andersen & Jæger, supra note 226, at 331-32. 
 240 Id. at 335-36. 
 241 See generally Hörning, supra note 229, at 352 (identifying differences 
among PTA methods). 
 242 See Crosby, supra note 229, at 157-58; Simon Joss, Participation in 
Parliamentary Technology Assessment: From Theory to Practice, in PARLIAMENTS AND 
TECHNOLOGY, supra note 80, at 325, 341.  
 243 See Peter C. Dienel & Ortwin Renn, Planning Cells: A Gate to “Fractal” 
Mediation, in FAIRNESS AND COMPETENCE IN CITIZEN PARTICIPATION, supra note 229, 
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2. Constructive Technology Assessment 
Unlike PTA and conventional TA, constructive 
technology assessment (CTA) seeks to influence technology 
design itself. Typically, innovation occurs within private 
laboratories outside of public scrutiny,244 and regulation is 
contemplated after a technology appears in commercial 
applications.245 In contrast to this typical approach, CTA seeks 
to promote interaction among stakeholders—technology 
developers, regulators, workers, end users, and the potentially 
affected public—during the technology development process.246 
By facilitating incorporation of interested parties’ values into 
the design process, such interaction can lead to more widely 
accepted outcomes with fewer adverse effects.247 CTA may 
involve public participation, but such participation serves as a 
means of shaping technology and identifying risks rather than 
as an end in and of itself.248 
Advocates have identified three key features of CTA: 
anticipation, reflexivity, and social learning.249 Anticipation of 
potential technological interactions and adverse side effects 
occurs through the involvement of a broad range of 
stakeholders early in the design process and through “early 
  
at 117, 121-24; Ortwin Renn et al., The Pursuit of Fair and Competent Citizen 
Participation, in FAIRNESS AND COMPETENCE IN CITIZEN PARTICIPATION, supra note 
229, at 339, 344. 
 244 SCLOVE, supra note 1, at 4; WESTRUM, supra note 79, at 107-27 (discussing 
process of invention).  
 245 See COLLINGRIDGE, supra note 1, at 16-19 (explaining that control of a 
technology is hampered at early stages by lack of knowledge about adverse 
consequences and at later stages by diffusion and entrenchment of the technology); see 
also Rip et al., supra note 217, at 2 (noting “two-track approach that separates 
promotional activities from control and regulation”). 
 246 Johan Schot, Towards New Forms of Participatory Technology 
Development, 13 TECH. ANALYSIS & STRATEGIC MGMT. 39, 40-41 (2001). The terms 
“interactive TA” and “real-time TA” refer to similar approaches. See David H. Guston & 
Daniel Sarewitz, Real-Time Technology Assessment, 24 TECH. SOC’Y 93, 97-98 (2002) 
(comparing real-time technology assessment with CTA); Rip, supra note 170, at 148. 
Although governmental or semi-governmental bodies are the more likely practitioners 
of CTA, businesses, nonprofit organizations, and other actors can perform and facilitate 
CTA as well. See Johan Schot & Arie Rip, The Past and Future of Constructive 
Technology Assessment, 54 TECH. FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 251, 256 (1996). 
 247 Schot, supra note 246, at 40-42; Arne Remmen, Pollution Prevention, 
Cleaner Technologies and Industry, in MANAGING TECHNOLOGY IN SOCIETY, supra note 
217, at 199, 201 (stating that “constructive approach aims at integrating social and 
environmental criteria right from the beginning”). 
 248 See Rip, supra note 170, at 147. 
 249 Schot, supra note 246, at 40. 
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and controlled experimentation.”250 Because not all concerns can 
be identified at the outset, however, the technology 
development process should be flexible and iterative, allowing 
for periodic reexamination of interactions and effects.251 
Reflexivity refers to an appreciation of the various social effects 
that different technology design options may have.252 Rather 
than focusing narrowly on technical goals, technology 
developers should take into account social, environmental, and 
other consequences as they design and evaluate new 
technologies. Finally, social learning refers to a mutual process 
in which relevant actors learn from each other in the course of 
technology development and use.253 Through social learning, 
companies learn about consumer preferences and regulatory 
requirements and can design products accordingly, and in 
addition, existing preferences and requirements might be 
shaped in favor of more sustainable technologies.254 Variants of 
CTA may incorporate public opinion polling, content analysis, 
and other tools to complement the basic CTA process.255 
Denmark and the Netherlands have been at the 
forefront of the development of PTA and CTA.256 In Denmark, 
where the consensus conference was developed, the technique 
has addressed topics such as the use of knowledge about the 
human genome, irradiation of food, and genetically engineered 
animals.257 These conferences produced recommendations that 
were later incorporated into legislation and policy.258 In the 
Netherlands, CTA techniques were applied to the creation and 
design of novel, environmentally-friendly alternatives to meat. 
  
 250 Id. at 43; Guston & Sarewitz, supra note 246, at 97-98. 
 251 Remmen, supra note 247, at 201; Schot, supra note 246, at 43-44. 
 252 Erik Fisher et al., Midstream Modulation of Technology: Governance from 
Within, 26 BULLETIN OF SCI., TECH. & SOC’Y 485, 492 (2006); Schot, supra note 246, at 
44. The concept is rooted in Ulrich Beck’s contention in Risk Society that a more 
reflexive, self-critical approach must replace the traditional technocratic understanding 
of science. See BECK, supra note 4, at 155-56.  
 253 Schot, supra note 246, at 44. 
 254 See id. at 44-45. 
 255 See Guston & Sarewitz, supra note 246, at 98; see also Sarewitz, supra note 
127, at 4-5 (describing principles of real-time TA). 
 256 See Thomas Petermann, Technology Assessment Units in the European 
Parliamentary Systems, in PARLIAMENTS AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 80, at 37, 49-50 
(discussing the discursive and participatory function of TA in Denmark and the 
Netherlands). 
 257 Lars Klüver, The Danish Board of Technology, in PARLIAMENTS AND 
TECHNOLOGY, supra note 80, at 173, 190-91. 
 258 See id. For a practical evaluation of PTA efforts in Denmark, see Joss, 
supra note 242, at 342-53. 
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Meetings between various stakeholders generated agreement 
on minimum standards for such products, and led technology 
developers to devote more attention to issues of taste and 
texture.259 More recently, the United States has begun to 
experiment with a variant of CTA, real-time technology 
assessment, in managing nanotechnology. This development is 
considered below in more detail.260 
3. Concerns 
Commentators have raised a number of concerns 
applicable to PTA and CTA. Notwithstanding such concerns, 
these more recent forms of technology assessment offer 
valuable options for society to manage new technologies more 
effectively and democratically. 
One obvious issue involves the interest and competence of 
laypersons. The average citizen is likely to have limited 
understanding of the technical matters that undergird modern 
technologies.261 Laypersons may defer to experts or rely on 
simplifying heuristics when assessing new technologies.262 Citizen 
participation could cripple technology development if 
unwarranted and irrational fears come to dominate the 
assessment process.263 Furthermore, low levels of voter turnout 
and other measures of civic engagement in general suggest that 
laypersons may not take much interest in technology 
assessment.264 
If given the opportunity to participate in a meaningful 
way, however, citizens have proven willing and competent to 
engage in matters of public debate. Layperson interest is 
suggested not only by anecdotal evidence, such as high levels of 
participation in policy blogs, but also by studies finding an 
  
 259 See Schot, supra note 246, at 47-48. 
 260 See infra Part III.B.4. 
 261 See Fiorino, supra note 229, at 227 (“Given the sheer complexity of the 
issues, the ‘transscientific’ nature of the factual premises, and the rapid changes in the 
definition of problems and their solutions, the lay public lacks the time, information, 
and inclination to take part in technically based problem solving.”). 
 262 See Matthew C. Nisbet & Dietram A. Scheufele, What’s Next for Science 
Communication? Promising Directions and Lingering Distractions, 96 AM. J. BOTANY 
1767, 1768 (2009) (remarking that the wider public tends to “rely on cognitive 
shortcuts and heuristic decision making to help them reach opinions about policy-
related matters” involving science and technology). 
 263 See Leonhard Hennen, Impacts of Participatory TA on Its Societal 
Environment, in KLÜVER ET AL., supra note 114, at 154. 
 264 See generally THOMAS E. PATTERSON, THE VANISHING VOTER: PUBLIC 
INVOLVEMENT IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY (2002). 
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eagerness to participate and resentment at exclusion.265 In 
evaluating citizen competence, it is critical to keep in mind that 
lay participation is primarily meant to provide a read on public 
values, particularly with respect to public understandings of 
risk, and not to replace technical expertise.266 Of course, 
laypersons sometimes do identify technical issues, problems, 
and contextual factors that experts have overlooked.267 But the 
main question is whether laypersons can become sufficiently 
informed on the technical issues such that they can apply their 
personal experiences, belief systems, and values to new 
technological situations of risk and uncertainty.268 PTA enables 
informed participation by providing citizens with the time and 
access to expertise required to learn about the issues.269 Citizens 
participating in PTA exercises have served effectively as 
“values consultants” and have not been too intimidated to 
question experts, regulators, and stakeholders critically.270 
Similarly, examples of citizen activism in technical 
controversies demonstrate that laypersons can come to 
sufficiently informed views, particularly if they develop 
cooperative relationships with experts.271 This is not to say that 
laypersons necessarily will agree with the experts or 
policymakers after engaging on technology matters. 
Ultimately, public opposition to the deployment of a new 
technology often reflects not an inability to comprehend 
  
 265 See FISCHER, supra note 233, at 35-36; see also Michael X. Delli Carpini et 
al., Public Deliberation, Discursive Participation, and Citizen Engagement, 7 ANN. REV. 
POL. SCI. 315, 315-16, 323-24, 336 (2004) (reviewing studies of public deliberation).  
 266 See FISCHER, supra note 233, at 42 (“[S]cience is laden with social value 
judgments, judgments typically hidden within the steps and phases of the research 
process . . . .”); Nisbet & Scheufele, supra note 262, at 1768 (noting that values are far 
more important determinants of public opinion about controversial areas of science 
than knowledge); see also supra Part I.B.2. 
 267 ALAN IRWIN, CITIZEN SCIENCE: A STUDY OF PEOPLE, EXPERTISE AND 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 172-73 (1995) (discussing citizens as a source of 
information and expertise); Fiorino, supra note 229, at 227; see also FISCHER, supra 
note 233, at 193-218 (discussing local knowledge that laypersons can contribute). 
 268 See FISCHER, supra note 233, at 132-42 (describing concept of cultural 
rationality). 
 269 See Dienel & Renn, supra note 243, at 125; see also FISCHER, supra note 
233, at 32 (contending that citizens “are much more capable of grappling with complex 
problems than generally assumed”).  
 270 Nisbet & Scheufele, supra note 262, at 1770 (reporting that participants 
not only learn about the technical, social, ethical, and economic aspects of the scientific 
topic, but also become more confident and motivated to participate in science 
decisions); Renn et al., supra note 243, at 345. 
 271 FISCHER, supra note 233, at 148-55 (discussing citizen activists’ efforts to 
combat AIDS, identify cancer clusters, and engage in a nuclear power plant siting decision). 
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scientific matters, but rather a distrust of the scientific and 
government institutions that are invested in them.272 
Another criticism of participatory approaches to TA 
concerns the legitimacy of citizen participation.273 Lay 
participants do not constitute democratic representatives of the 
public will. In addition, because they need not answer to an 
electorate, participants may endorse unrealistic or politically 
infeasible policy options.274 PTA, however, does not replace 
representative decision-making procedures. Rather, PTA serves 
in a consultative role in support of decisions made by elected 
representatives who are politically accountable.275 PTA thus 
incorporates elements of direct participatory democracy, yet 
remains rooted in a representative democratic system.276 The 
method of selecting lay participants nevertheless does matter to 
the credibility and utility of the process. While random selection 
of participants does not ensure that citizen deliberations will be 
representative, it can facilitate the expression of a wide range of 
views, promote participants’ independence, and ameliorate 
interest group efforts to rig the process.277 
To the extent that PTA and CTA techniques tend to 
emphasize the formation of consensus, they may mute the 
expression of alternative viewpoints or dampen values conflicts 
that are healthy for social risk management.278 Conversely, 
achieving consensus may not be possible where value 
differences are great, as is often the case with new 
technologies.279 Indeed, one review of PTA efforts suggests that 
PTA “increases the complexity of decision making by taking 
into account different values to assess impacts of technology, 
[and] by supplying all information and knowledge available 
  
 272 Brian Wynne, Creating Public Alienation: Expert Cultures of Risk and 
Ethics on GMOs, 10 SCI. AS CULTURE 445, 447, 475-76 (2001). 
 273 Armour, supra note 229, at 180; Hans-Jörg Seiler, Review of “Planning 
Cells:” Problems of Legitimation, in FAIRNESS AND COMPETENCE IN CITIZEN 
PARTICIPATION, supra note 229, at 142-49.  
 274 See Dienel & Renn, supra note 243, at 129. 
 275 See KLÜVER ET AL., supra note 114, at 171; Dienel & Renn, supra note 243, 
at 129; Hörning, supra note 229, at 357.  
 276 See Joss, supra note 242, at 335-36. 
 277 KLÜVER ET AL., supra note 114, at 134; Hörning, supra note 229, at 357; 
Renn et al., supra note 243, at 353. Notwithstanding random selection, certain 
demographic groups, such as students and retirees, may be overrepresented on citizen 
panels, just as they tend to be overrepresented on ordinary juries. See Dienel & Renn, 
supra note 243, at 125. 
 278 See Audley Genus, Rethinking Constructive Technology Assessment as 
Democratic, Reflective Discourse, 73 TECH. FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 13, 19 (2006). 
 279 See Renn et al., supra note 243, at 353-54. 
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and conveying uncertainties or deficiencies of knowledge.”280 
Moreover, the time constraints inherent in some participatory 
techniques may not allow adequate opportunity for the sort of 
deep normative deliberation that democratic idealists might 
desire.281 These concerns underscore the limitations of PTA and 
CTA in reflecting the full range of public values and in 
providing concrete solutions.282 Participatory approaches to TA 
nonetheless can identify public concerns and provide a useful 
roadmap for future research and analysis.283 
The most serious objections to PTA and CTA involve the 
relatively limited effect that such assessments may have on 
actual decisions. Unless technology assessment efforts are 
integrated into the policy-making process, those efforts may 
prove to be little more than an academic exercise. Simply 
providing the results of assessments to decisionmakers may not 
overcome the domination of political decisions by vested 
interests.284 Policymakers may be inclined to dismiss such 
results as neither representative nor the product of expert 
deliberation.285 And public participation may be of limited value 
if experts control the framing of a problem and of policy 
options.286 Rather than changing the relationship between 
society and new technologies, TA might merely defuse 
opposition by creating the appearance of an open, participatory 
process.287 At the same time, powerful actors might escape 
accountability for their role in promoting risky technologies.288 
  
 280 KLÜVER ET AL., supra note 114, at 155. 
 281 See FISCHER, supra note 233, at 238-39 (“Beyond merely uncovering 
normative assumptions and beliefs, deliberation can lead to changes in assumptions, as 
well as creations of new ones.”). 
 282 See KLÜVER ET AL., supra note 114, at 155 (describing TA as a “contested 
field of interests, preferences and values”). 
 283 See Arie Rip, Assessing the Impact of Innovation: New Developments in 
Technology Assessment, in OECD PROCEEDINGS: SOCIAL SCIENCES AND INNOVATION 
197, 197 (2001). 
 284 See KLÜVER ET AL., supra note 114, at 154. 
 285 See Seiler, supra note 273, at 150.  
 286 Alan Irwin, Constructing the Scientific Citizen: Science and Democracy in the 
Biosciences, 10 PUB. UNDERSTANDING SCI. 1, 12-13 (2001) (discussing an example in 
which the institutional framing of public consultation constrained the role of the public). 
 287 Genus, supra note 278, at 21-23 (suggesting potential for TA to become a 
“participation trap”); see also Wynne, supra note 107, at 463 (suggesting that efforts to 
make science and technology more participatory “have perversely reinforced attention 
only on back-end scientific questions about consequences” and thus “exclude[d] more 
reflexive questions about the human purposes and visions which shape front-end 
innovation commitments”).  
 288 See Genus, supra note 278, at 19. 
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Indeed, the effect of citizen deliberations on 
policymaking, while difficult to measure, generally appears 
modest.289 Defenders of PTA attribute the limited policy impact of 
PTA to its consultative nature; PTA is intended to inform rather 
than to dictate policy decisions.290 Critics, however, contend that 
PTA fails to bring about the multi-way communication between 
lay citizens, stakeholders, and decision makers that is needed.291 
Ensuring openness in the process and widespread dissemination 
of results,292 while timing citizen deliberations so that their 
output can be incorporated into an ongoing decision-making 
process, can enhance PTA’s effectiveness.293 Likewise, 
incorporating the results of CTA into actual technological 
development has proven to be a daunting challenge.294 
Technology developers are often reluctant to open up their 
processes to outsider scrutiny, let alone outsider participation. 
Absent a regulatory mandate, the effect of CTA activities may be 
at best indirect, serving primarily as an external critique or 
source of pressure on technology developers.295 
4. Incipient U.S. PTA/CTA Efforts . . . and Beyond 
Attempts to use modified TA techniques in the United 
States during the 1980s and 1990s were limited in scope and 
generally did not consider emerging technologies.296 More 
recently, however, the growing field of nanotechnology has 
become a testing ground for these methods.297 The 21st Century 
  
 289 Hörning, supra note 229, at 356. 
 290 KLÜVER ET AL., supra note 114, at 11. 
 291 See Armour, supra note 229, at 181. 
 292 Hörning, supra note 229, at 356. In the Netherlands, for example, PTA 
organizers have sought to increase the influence of lay panels by raising their profile 
and by facilitating communications between the panels and the general public via the 
Internet. Rinie van Est, The Rathenau Institute’s Approach to Participatory TA, TA-
DATABASE-NEWSL. (Institut für Technikfolgenabschätzung und Systemanalyse), Oct. 
2000, at 13, 18, available at http://www.itas.fzk.de/deu/tadn/tadn003/vest00a.pdf.  
 293 KLÜVER ET AL., supra note 114, at 146. The desired timing may depend on 
the function of PTA in a particular case: if the intent is to initiate debate or decide 
whether to fund basic research, PTA should occur early in the process; if the intent is 
to assess suitable applications of a controversial technology, PTA can be deferred, but 
nonetheless should take place before irreversible commitments are made. Id. at 145-47. 
 294 Schot & Rip, supra note 246, at 255.  
 295 See id. at 255-56; SCLOVE, supra note 1, at 6 (European industries have 
“come to support [PTA] as a low-stress, low-cost mechanism for gauging societal 
reactions to alternative research, development and innovation trajectories.”).  
 296 See Dienel & Renn, supra note 243, at 135-36 (describing use of planning 
cells in the 1980s). 
 297 For a summary of U.S. PTA efforts, see SCLOVE, supra note 1, at 43-46. 
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Nanotechnology Research and Development Act 
(“Nanotechnology Act”) established a national nanotechnology 
program whose mission includes “ensuring that ethical, legal, 
environmental, and other appropriate societal concerns, 
including the potential use of nanotechnology in enhancing 
human intelligence and in developing artificial intelligence 
which exceeds human capacity, are considered during the 
development of nanotechnology.”298 The Nanotechnology Act 
anticipates integration of public input in this process “through 
mechanisms such as citizens’ panels, consensus conferences, 
and educational events.”299 
Per Congress’s direction in the Nanotechnology Act, the 
National Science Foundation has funded the Centers for 
Nanotechnology in Society at Arizona State University (CNS-
ASU) and the University of California, Santa Barbara to 
identify and address social, ethical, and environmental 
concerns.300 CNS-ASU is developing a “real-time technology 
assessment” program incorporating CTA principles of 
reflexivity and anticipatory governance.301 The program consists 
of four main components: (1) characterizing nanotechnology 
research; (2) monitoring opinion and values among researchers 
and the public regarding nanotechnology; (3) involving 
researchers and the public in deliberation and shared 
participation; and (4) assessing the program’s effects on 
nanotechnology researchers and on nanotechnology in society.302 
Efforts to integrate modified TA techniques into 
nanotechnology development pursuant to the Act represent a 
promising departure from the past, and these efforts are still in 
  
 298 15 U.S.C. § 7501(b)(10) (2006). 
 299 Id. § 7501(b)(10)(D). 
 300 The discussion here focuses on CNS-ASU’s more extensive efforts in the 
area of real-time technology assessment. For a description of research activities at 
CNS-UCSB, see Research, CNS-UCSB, http://www.cns.ucsb.edu/research (last visited 
Jan. 20, 2011); see also Nick Pidgeon et al., Deliberating the Risks of Nanotechnologies 
for Energy and Health Applications in the United States and United Kingdom, 4 
NATURE NANOTECHNOLOGY 95 (2009) (discussing results of public workshops on energy 
and health nanotechnologies held at Santa Barbara and in the United Kingdom).  
 301 See David H. Guston, The Center for Nanotechnology in Society at Arizona 
State University and the Prospects for Anticipatory Governance, in NANOSCALE: ISSUES 
AND PERSPECTIVES FOR THE NANO CENTURY 377, 380 (Nigel M. de S. Cameron & M. 
Ellen Mitchell eds., 2007); see also Daniel Barben et al., Anticipatory Governance of 
Nanotechnology: Foresight, Engagement & Integration, in THE HANDBOOK OF SCIENCE 
& TECHNOLOGY STUDIES (Edward J. Hackett et al. eds., 3d ed. 2008).  
 302 See Guston, supra note 301, at 382-84; see also Center for Nanotechnology 
in Society at Arizona State University, CNS-ASU, http://cns.asu.edu/index.htm (last 
visited Jan. 20, 2011). 
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progress. But for the reasons discussed below, they fall short in 
generating the upfront assessment and widespread public 
participation needed. 
For example, an important part of CNS-ASU’s efforts to 
engage the public was the organization of a “National Citizens’ 
Technology Forum” (NCTF) linking six groups of citizens from 
different parts of the United States.303 The forum, held in 2008, 
did not deliberate on nanotechnology in general, but instead 
focused on the specific topic of human enhancement through 
nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technologies, and 
cognitive science.304 Following face-to-face and electronic 
deliberative sessions, each group of citizens drafted a report 
that represented the consensus of the group.305 The organizers 
of the forum concluded that citizens are supportive of research 
on these transformational technologies if coupled with 
trustworthy oversight, and that “average citizens want to be 
involved in the technological decisions that might end up 
shaping their lives.”306 
The results of the NCTF do suggest that citizens have 
the desire and ability to participate in decisions about 
technology development. In addition, the citizens’ reports 
reflect a slice of public opinion reached after substantial 
deliberation. Nonetheless, the ultimate impact of the NCTF on 
actual nanotechnology development and policy appears 
minimal. Simply publishing citizens’ reports hardly ensures 
any influence on the course of research or on nanotechnology 
regulation.307 The reports have no clear constituency or 
audience, and efforts to diffuse them have been limited.308 
  
 303 HAMLETT ET AL., supra note 60. A similar citizens’ jury met in the United 
Kingdom in 2005 to consider nanotechnology. That group made recommendations on 
the use of nanotechnology in health care and renewable energy, and called for labeling, 
safety testing, and greater public involvement in the direction of research. See James 
Wilsdon, Paddling Upstream: New Currents in European Technology Assessment, in 
RODEMEYER ET AL., supra note 103. 
 304 HAMLETT ET AL., supra note 60, at 1; Brice Laurent, Replicating 
Participatory Devices: The Consensus Conference Confronts Nanotechnology 5 (Centre 
de Sociologie de l’Innovation Working Paper No. 018, 2009). 
 305 HAMLETT ET AL., supra note 60, at 1. 
 306 Id. at 2. 
 307 Cf. Maria Powell & Daniel Lee Kleinman, Building Citizen Capacities for 
Participation in Nanotechnology Decision-Making: The Democratic Virtues of the 
Consensus Conference Model, 17 PUB. UNDERSTANDING SCI. 329, 341, 344 (2008) 
(reporting that several participants in 2005 Wisconsin nanotechnology consensus 
conference expressed view that neither scientists nor government would be responsive 
to their concerns and that the conference would not influence policy). 
 308 See Laurent, supra note 304, at 12; see also Ira Bennett & Daniel Sarewitz, 
Too Little, Too Late?: Research Policies on the Societal Implications of Nanotechnology 
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Indeed, one commentator characterized the NCTF primarily 
“as a social scientific research instrument.”309 The main purpose 
of the NCTF, in other words, was to demonstrate the value of 
deliberation and to investigate ways of structuring consensus 
conferences to foster high-quality deliberation.310 Apparently, 
the objective of influencing technology development or 
technology policy was of far less importance. Furthermore, 
although participants in the NCTF undoubtedly learned about 
and became engaged in the issues, the public at large was not 
brought into the process and generally remains uninformed 
about nanotechnology.311 
There are a number of other shortcomings in technology 
assessment efforts under the Nanotechnology Act. First, the 
magnitude of those efforts is dwarfed by the magnitude of 
efforts to develop and implement nanotechnology. Only about 
5% of federal nanotechnology funding—authorized for a total of 
approximately $3.7 billion from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 
2008312—falls under the rubric of research on health and 
environmental effects. That general category includes a wide 
range of projects such as the use of nanotechnology to 
remediate environmental pollution; only about one-third of that 
five percent figure supports research aimed at addressing 
nanotechnology’s hazards.313 Given this funding imbalance and 
the diversity of nanomaterials to be studied, identifying health 
  
in the United States, 15 SCI. AS CULTURE 309, 319 (2006) (noting that the 21st Century 
Nanotechnology Research and Development Act does not specify “the processes by 
which research results are to enhance decision making”). 
 309 Laurent, supra note 304, at 11. One researcher involved in the NCTF 
observed that participants “knew that they were part of a research project” and 
consequently “tended to not even bother to fight for ideas or opinion[s].” Id. at 25 
(emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 310 Id. at 10-11. 
 311 HART RESEARCH ASSOCS., NANOTECHNOLOGY, SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY & 
PUBLIC OPINION 1 (2009), available at http://www.nanotechproject.org/process/assets/ 
files/8286/nano_synbio.pdf (reporting that “nearly 7 in 10 [Americans] (68%) have 
heard just a little or nothing about [nanotechnology]”); Guston, supra note 301, at 389 
(noting that polls reflect modest public knowledge of and engagement in 
nanotechnology); see also Elizabeth A. Corley & Dietram A. Scheufele, Outreach Gone 
Wrong?, SCIENTIST, Jan. 2010, at 22 (finding “widening gaps in nanotech knowledge 
between the least educated and the most educated citizens”). Broadening public 
awareness of and engagement in nanotechnology is left to the Nanoscale Informal 
Science Education Network (NISE Net), which promotes nanotechnology education 
through science museums. See Guston, supra note 301, at 379, 389; NANOSCALE 
INFORMAL SCI. EDUC. NETWORK, http://www.nisenet.org (last visited Jan. 20, 2011). 
 312 15 U.S.C. § 7505 (2006). 
 313 J. CLARENCE DAVIES, WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS, 
NANOTECHNOLOGY OVERSIGHT: AN AGENDA FOR THE NEW ADMINISTRATION 7 (2008), 
available at http://nanotechproject.org/process/assets/files/6709/pen13.pdf. 
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and environmental concerns and integrating them into the 
technology development process is a daunting challenge. 
Nanotechnology development essentially “got a 15 year head 
start”314 on technology assessment efforts, with the number of 
nanotechnology-based consumer products currently on the 
market exceeding one thousand.315 Although nanotechnology 
products are becoming increasingly common, quantitative and 
validated risk assessment data for nanotechnology remains 
generally unavailable, and will continue to be unavailable for 
some time.316 
Moreover, as CNS-ASU Director David Guston has 
observed, overall nanotechnology research “has grown much 
larger and faster than the societal implications work that 
might engage it.”317 Whether the TA efforts sponsored by the 
Nanotechnology Act will affect the overall course of 
nanotechnology research and development is uncertain.318 CNS-
ASU’s efforts to encourage nanotechnology researchers to be 
more reflexive about their research have influenced research 
focus and design in some individual instances, but such 
influence has been limited largely to graduate student 
researchers on the ASU campus.319 Similarly, the role of the 
NCTF and other technology assessment activities within the 
broader context of nanotechnology research is somewhat 
unclear. As other commentators have explained, the 
Nanotechnology Act contains an inherent tension between the 
goal of promoting rapid nanotechnology development and 
  
 314 Bennett & Sarewitz, supra note 308, at 322. 
 315 Analysis, PROJECT ON EMERGING NANOTECHNOLOGIES, http://www. 
nanotechproject.org/inventories/consumer/analysis_draft (last visited Jan. 19, 2011) 
(“As of August 25, 2009, the nanotechnology consumer products inventory contains 
1015 products or product lines.”). 
 316 See Elizabeth A. Corley et al., Of Risks and Regulations: How Leading U.S. 
Nanoscientists Form Policy Stances About Nanotechnology, 11 J. NANOPARTICLE RES. 
1573, 1574 (2009). 
 317 Guston, supra note 301, at 389 (noting that “a $1 billion/per year NNI in the 
United States overwhelms the $3-million/year nanotechnology-in-society network”); see also 
Guston & Sarewitz, supra note 246, at 106 (noting that widespread nano-scale science and 
engineering activity “is already too large and diverse to be the subject of a single TA effort”).  
 318 Cf. Monika Kurath & Priska Gisler, Informing, Involving or Engaging? 
Science Communication, in the Ages of Atom-, Bio-, and Nanotechnology, 18 PUB. 
UNDERSTANDING SCI. 559, 568 (2009) (contending that public outreach efforts in 
Europe with respect to nanotechnology have occurred after major investment decisions 
were already made and “tend to limit public engagement to matters of values and 
social and ethical aspects, rather than to expose expertise to scrutiny”). 
 319 See Guston, supra note 301, at 384-85; Interview with Jameson Wetmore, Ass’t 
Professor, Ariz. State Univ., in Pacific Grove, CA (Mar. 24, 2010). Efforts to export such 
activities to other universities have begun. Interview with Jameson Wetmore, supra. 
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implementation and the goal of integrating societal concerns 
into the research and development process.320 The risk remains 
that technology assessment efforts with respect to 
nanotechnology may serve as little more than a political tool for 
obtaining public acceptance.321 
Thus, notwithstanding some progress in addressing the 
concerns raised at the outset of this article,322 questions persist 
regarding how to promote a broader and more thorough 
analysis of a technology’s consequences, how to engage the 
general public in emerging technology issues, and how to 
interject public values more forcefully into the technology 
decision-making process. 
A recent proposal for facilitating expert assessment and 
citizen participation involves the establishment of an “Expert 
& Citizen Assessment of Science & Technology Network” 
comprised of universities, science museums, policy institutions, 
and nonprofit organizations.323 Such a network would not 
require legislative approval or appropriation and could act 
flexibly in selecting, framing, and analyzing topics for 
assessment.324 It is vital, however, that the network’s processes 
and analyses be well-executed, insightful, and nonpartisan in 
order to establish credibility with policymakers and the public. 
One means of linking PTA more immediately to 
policymaking would be to involve elected officials and other 
policymakers directly in the technology assessment process. 
During the 1980s, several citizens’ juries were convened in the 
United States on an experimental basis.325 In an effort to 
  
 320 E.g., Erik Fisher & Roop L. Mahajan, Contradictory Intent? US Federal 
Legislation on Integrating Societal Concerns into Nanotechnology Research and 
Development, 33 SCI. & PUB. POL’Y, Feb. 2006, at 5, 10-14 (comparing 15 U.S.C. 
§ 7501(b)(1)-(9) (2006) with § 7501(b)(10)). 
 321 See Mette Ebbesen, The Role of The Humanities and Social Sciences in 
Nanotechnology Research and Development, 2 NANOETHICS 1, 2-3 (2008); see also 
Fisher & Mahajan, supra note 320, at 13 (“Depending on how it is implemented, the 
Act could emerge as a shrewd piece of legislative rhetoric, reducing societal research 
and related activities to a sideshow in order to push rapid nanotechnology development 
past a potentially wary public, or as a tool for ushering in a prudent new paradigm in 
technology development . . . .”); Tee Rogers-Hayden & Nick Pidgeon, Moving 
Engagement “Upstream”? Nanotechnologies and the Royal Society and Royal Academy 
of Engineering’s Inquiry, 16 PUB. UNDERSTANDING SCI. 345, 345 (2007) (discussing 
danger that public engagement on nanotechnology in the United Kingdom “may well, 
intentionally or unintentionally, serve only token purposes”). 
 322 See Part I.B. 
 323 See SCLOVE, supra note 1, at 38-41. 
 324 Id. at 38-39. 
 325 According to one organizer, legislators viewed these efforts “as a bother at 
best and, at worst, as a real challenge to the way business is currently conducted.” 
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overcome the political and cultural resistance to these forms of 
public participation, organizers convinced two congressional 
representatives to participate in portions of citizens’ jury 
hearings.326 Widespread legislator participation in PTA is 
unlikely, however, given the numerous demands on legislators’ 
time and the limited payoff for legislators who do participate. 
A more realistic approach would have politicians raise 
the profile of emerging technology issues for the purpose of 
stimulating public debate. A prominent example of this 
approach involves federal funding of research on stem cells 
derived from human embryos. In 2001, President George W. 
Bush issued a statement limiting such funding after personally 
deliberating on the issue in a very public way.327 Of interest 
here is not the substance of that decision, which was criticized 
on a number of grounds328 and later reversed by President 
Obama,329 but rather the process leading up to it. Although that 
controversy involved primarily ethical concerns, the public 
discussions surrounding the issue demonstrate how public 
deliberation on technology matters can identify important 
societal values at stake.330 President Bush’s high-profile 
consideration of the issue appropriately expanded to the 
general public a debate that had been previously limited to a 
“small, professionally invested elite.”331 Government support for 
efforts to communicate emerging technology issues broadly through 
cable channels such as the Discovery Channel, local media outlets, 
and creative media would similarly foster public engagement.332 
Nonbinding national technology referendums are 
another promising mechanism to increase public involvement 
and input. Potential subjects of such referendums could be 
identified by Congress, the president, or the CEQ. Ideally, such 
  
Crosby, supra note 229, at 159; see also id. at 167 (noting “cultural discrepancy” 
between citizens’ jury process and “normal political procedure”). 
 326 Id. 
 327 Press Release, White House Office of Commc’ns, Remarks by the President 
on Stem Cell Research (Aug. 9, 2001), 2001 WL 896981. 
 328 E.g., Russell Korobkin, Embryonic Histrionics: A Critical Evaluation of the 
Bush Stem Cell Funding Policy and the Congressional Alternative, 47 JURIMETRICS 1 (2006). 
 329 Exec. Order No. 13,505, 74 Fed. Reg. 10,667 (Mar. 11, 2009). 
 330 See Richard Lacayo, How Bush Got There, TIME, Aug. 20, 2001, at 17 (discussing 
President Bush’s consultations on the subject and accompanying political debate).  
 331 Paul Root Wolpe & Glenn McGee, “Expert Bioethics” as Professional 
Discourse: The Case of Stem Cells, in THE HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELL DEBATE 185, 
186 (Suzanne Holland et al. eds., 2001); see also Gretchen Vogel, Rumors and Trial 
Balloons Precede Bush’s Funding Decision, 293 SCIENCE 186 (2001). 
 332 Nisbet & Scheufele, supra note 262, at 1774-75. 
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referendums would take place on a periodic basis after citizens’ 
juries or similar panels have already met to consider an 
emerging technology. An appointed panel of experts, social 
scientists, and citizens would develop a limited number of 
questions, each having several possible responses, to be set 
forth in the referendums.333 The purpose of such referendums 
would be to supplement, rather than to replace representative 
decision making.334 A technology referendum would bring the 
broader public into discussions about technology and would 
provide an opportunity for a societal-level debate.335 Such 
debate could take into account the in-depth considerations and 
recommendations of citizens’ juries, which would help to 
counter the effects of any superficial media campaigns that 
would likely arise.336 Through technology referendums, the 
public would gain a direct voice in critical developments that 
shape their lives.337 
Of course, referendums are an imperfect tool for 
gauging public sentiment or promoting public deliberation. 
Like voters in general, referendum voters tend to be older, 
wealthier, and more educated than the average person.338 The 
  
 333 Presenting several options would generate more information about voter 
preferences while encouraging voters to think as public citizens. See BENJAMIN R. 
BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE 286-88 (2003). 
 334 See David Butler & Austin Ranney, Theory, in REFERENDUMS AROUND THE 
WORLD: THE GROWING USE OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY 11, 13-16 (David Butler & Austin 
Ranney eds., 1994) (discussing benefits from supplementing representative institutions 
with referendums); Maija Setälä, On the Problems of Responsibility and Accountability 
in Referendums, 45 EUR. J. POL. RES. 699, 701-02 (2006). The potential for a 
referendum to undermine representative institutions, see Butler & Ranney, supra, at 
20, is reduced by making the referendums nonbinding. The use of a nonbinding 
procedure at the national level has the additional advantage of requiring only 
congressional authorization, rather than constitutional amendment. 
 335 Bruno S. Frey, Efficiency and Democratic Political Organisation; The Case 
for the Referendum, 12 J. PUB. POL’Y 209, 219 (1992) (contending that the public 
discussion induced by referenda “shapes the citizens’ preferences” by confronting them 
with issues they have not previously considered and by encouraging them to evaluate 
those issues according to their basic values). 
 336 See BARBER, supra note 333, at 267-98 (recommending that participatory 
institutions include mechanisms for improving people’s competence to make reasonable 
political judgments); Setälä, supra note 334, at 702-03 (discussing deliberative 
democratic rationale for the referendum and initiative). 
 337 BARBER, supra note 333, at 284 (“In sum, the initiative and referendum 
can increase popular participation in and responsibility for government, provide a 
permanent instrument of civic education, and give popular talk the reality and 
discipline of power that it needs to be effective.”); see also THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT 
DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 78-79 (1989) 
(discussing surveys finding that citizens generally are in favor of having a direct vote 
with respect to important issues and policies). 
 338 See Butler & Ranney, supra note 334, at 18; CRONIN, supra note 337, at 76-77. 
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results of a nonbinding referendum could be viewed as 
analogous to the results of a national public opinion poll.339 And 
questions must be framed with care to ensure their 
comprehensibility and neutrality. But nonbinding referendums 
could bring needed attention to emerging technology issues and 
prove far more effective than polls in engaging and educating 
the public.340 A nonbinding referendum would essentially open 
up the public hearing phase of legislation to the country, while 
leaving the lawmaking details and final exercise of policy 
judgments to Congress.341 Moreover, as an empirical matter, 
representative bodies often do follow the results of nonbinding 
referendums, a fact that suggests their persuasive effect on 
elected officials is tangible.342 Carrying out such referendums in 
conjunction with each presidential election would promote 
relatively high turnout and public interest and limit the 
potential for strategic timing of referendums.343 
The most powerful tools for bringing about effective and 
open technology assessment would involve stronger incentives 
for technology developers to consider public concerns, including 
health and environmental risks. First, technology assessment 
and public involvement should be included as criteria for 
awarding research grants. The National Science Foundation 
(NSF), for example, considers both the “intellectual merit” and 
the “broader impacts” of proposed research in reviewing 
research grant proposals.344 Under the “broader impacts 
  
 339 See CRONIN, supra note 337, at 179. 
 340 See David Butler & Austin Ranney, Theory, in REFERENDUMS: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PRACTICE AND THEORY 23, 30 (David Butler & Austin Ranney 
eds., 1978) (explaining how referendums can bring policymaking and political decisions 
psychologically closer to the people); CRONIN, supra note 337, at 87-89 (noting need for 
ingenuity in efforts to interest and inform voters, while concluding that “[v]oters who 
do vote on ballot measures do so more responsibly and intelligently than we have any 
right to expect”); see also MAIJA SETÄLÄ, REFERENDUMS AND DEMOCRATIC 
GOVERNMENT: NORMATIVE THEORY AND THE ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONS 165 (1999) 
(suggesting that “referendums offer the increasing number of citizens outside party 
organisations and without strong party identification an opportunity to participate in 
decision-making without the mediation of the parties”).  
 341 See CRONIN, supra note 337, at 178. 
 342 See Setälä, supra note 334, at 713-14. 
 343 Where candidate choices and referendum propositions are on the same 
ballot, there is on average a fifteen percentage point drop-off in the proportion of voters 
casting ballots on the latter as compared with the former. See Butler & Ranney, supra 
note 334, at 16. However, propositions involving controversial or highly visible issues 
may attract higher levels of voting. CRONIN, supra note 337, at 67-69. 
 344 Robert Frodeman & Jonathan Parker, Intellectual Merit and Broader 
Impact: The National Science Foundation’s Broader Impacts Criterion and the Question 
of Peer Review, 23 SOC. EPISTEMOLOGY 337, 339 (2009). The federal government funds over 
one-quarter of research and development expenditures in the United States. Mark Boroush, 
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criterion” (BIC), the NSF considers whether a proposal would 
“promot[e] teaching, training and learning,” “broaden the 
participation of underrepresented groups,” “enhance the 
infrastructure for research and education,” enhance scientific 
understanding, and provide benefits to society.345 In theory, the 
BIC could be a means of evaluating a research proposal’s 
incorporation of public participation and the social and 
environmental implications of such research. But application of 
the BIC has run into deep-rooted resistance among researchers 
and reviewers in the scientific community.346 In practice, the 
BIC is often treated as a relatively unimportant criterion that 
can be fulfilled merely by hiring educational professionals to 
disseminate information to the general public.347 Such a limited 
conception of the BIC not only fails to encourage scientists to 
involve the public in the process of technology research and 
development; it also fails to transform how the scientists think 
about their research and its broader societal implications.348 
Including social scientists on proposal review panels would be 
one way of facilitating an expanded understanding of the BIC 
and ensuring that it plays a role in government research 
funding decisions.349 Another way to make the BIC more 
effective and to encourage reflexivity within the scientific 
community would be for NSF to amend its grant proposal 
  
New NSF Estimates Indicate that U.S. R&D Spending Continued to Grow in 2008, 
INFOBRIEF, Jan. 2010, available at http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/infbrief/nsf10312; see also 
Corley et al., supra note 316, at 1577 (discussing survey finding that nanotechnology 
researchers rely heavily on government grants). 
 345 NAT’L SCI. FOUND., OMB CONTROL NO. 3145-0058, PROPOSAL AND AWARD 
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES GUIDE pt. I, ch. II, at 8 (2009); NAT’L SCI. FOUND., MERIT 
REVIEW BROADER IMPACTS CRITERION: REPRESENTATIVE ACTIVITIES (2007), available at 
http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/gpg/broaderimpacts.pdf. 
 346 Holbrook, supra note 165, at 437-48 (describing difficulties encountered in 
applying BIC and suggesting that difficulties reflect basic philosophical differences 
regarding the relevance of broader social considerations to “pure” scientific research). 
 347 Frodeman & Parker, supra note 344, at 340-41 (“BIC is not simply an 
education and public outreach . . . criterion—but it generally gets (mis)interpreted in 
this way.”); Robert Frodeman & J. Britt Holbrook, Science’s Social Effects, ISSUES SCI. 
& TECH., Spring 2007, at 28, 28. 
 348 Frodeman & Holbrook, supra note 347, at 28 (observing that such an 
approach to BIC “emphasize[s] a triumphalist view” of science and technology and that 
it “does not reflect on the larger moral, political, and policy implications of the advance 
of scientific knowledge and technological capabilities”). 
 349 Id. at 30; see also Frodeman & Parker, supra note 344, at 342 (advocating 
interaction between scientists and researchers on science, technology, and society at all 
stages of research). 
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guidance to explicitly state the importance of consulting with 
the public and considering a broader range of impacts.350 
Finally, it is essential to put incentives in place to hold 
technology developers responsible for the adverse health and 
environmental effects of their products. An important step 
towards this goal would be to require greater disclosure to 
increase social awareness of emerging technologies and their 
uses. Labeling foods that contain GMOs or products that 
incorporate nanotechnology can enable more informed 
consumer choices, increase general public awareness of new 
technologies, and reduce barriers to holding manufacturers 
legally responsible for adverse consequences caused by their 
products.351 Additional measures will likely be necessary, 
however, to create stronger incentives further upstream in the 
technology development process. One such measure could 
impose liability under tort law for “foreseeably unforeseeable” 
consequences of new technologies.352 Or, as I have contended 
elsewhere with respect to products containing nanomaterials, 
environmental assurance bonding can be a suitable policy tool 
to address situations where health and environmental risks are 
substantially uncertain.353 Requiring companies that introduce 
new technologies in such circumstances to post bonds helps to 
assure “the existence of funds to pay for damages that are 
subsequently discovered,” without blocking new technologies 
from entering the market.354 Bonding requirements also give 
companies an economic incentive to undertake research to 
demonstrate that their products are safe.355 The prospect of 
reducing or releasing the bond would prompt companies to 
support technology assessment more actively—by conducting 
assessments themselves or by facilitating government or 
independent third-party assessments. Environmental 
assurance bonding ultimately offers, as Doug Kysar has 
argued, a “pragmatic combination of respect for the power of 
  
 350 Cf. Rip, supra note 170, at 150-55 (recommending interactions between 
different types of actors in order to increase reflexivity in development of 
nanotechnology). 
 351 Lin, supra note 52, at 393-94. 
 352 See Owen, supra note 2, at 609-10 (suggesting that such liability should be 
limited “to situations where industry has recklessly let loose untested new technology 
with frightening potential consequences”). 
 353 Lin, supra note 52, at 397-404. 
 354 Id. at 398-99. 
 355 Id.  
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markets and human technology, and caution before the 
complexities of nature.”356 
CONCLUSION 
Transforming our approach to emerging technologies to 
integrate more thorough assessment and greater public 
participation into the ongoing process of technology 
management will not be easy. By their very nature, emerging 
technologies often defy prediction regarding their developmental 
paths, applications, and adverse consequences. Furthermore, the 
approach advocated here runs counter to cultural norms that 
celebrate innovation, scientific paradigms that emphasize 
freedom of inquiry and expert peer review, and political 
discourse that demands scientific certainty as a prerequisite for 
regulatory oversight. Yet to continue with our current approach 
would be narrow, shortsighted, and unrepresentative. At the 
very least, the government can take modest steps towards 
taking technology assessment seriously by reconstituting the 
OTA and revisiting NEPA’s potential as a tool for meaningful 
planning and participation in technology matters. Transforming 
our relationships with emerging technologies, however, will 
require more radical mechanisms to incorporate citizen 
participation and to compel thoughtful and responsible 
technology development. Ultimately, citizens must take an 
active role in the management of emerging technologies by 
informing themselves on the issues, participating in assessment 
and management processes, and demanding that their 
representatives exercise effective oversight. 
  
 356 Douglas A. Kysar, Ecologic: Nanotechnology, Environmental Assurance 
Bonding, and Symmetric Humility, 28 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 201, 208-09 (2010). 
